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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters with a central theme on Hispanic inflows and public
goods provision. The first paper investigates how Hispanic immigrant inflows affect K-12 public
education finance in the US. I first document the long-run trend of mean household income and
average number of children per household for Hispanic immigrant households relative to native
households. An accounting calculation suggests that the tax price of per-pupil spending increases
by 7% from 1970 to 2010 due to Hispanic immigrant inflows. Using the historical pattern of
immigrant settlements as a source of exogenous variation, I quantify the causal impact of immigrant
inflows on public education spending. I find that an increase of ten percentage points in the share
of Hispanic immigrant children in the child population decreases per-pupil current spending by
13%, equivalent to about $1,300 per student when evaluated at the 2010 mean spending level.
In addition, I find that Hispanic immigrant inflows largely reduce the demand for redistribution
on education spending from the state government. A ten-percentage point increase in a state’s
population of Hispanic immigrant children causes per-pupil state spending to decrease by 30%.
The second chapter investigates how the adoption of the Systematic Alien Verification of Entitle-
ment (SAVE) program affects Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) participation
by immigrant adults and US-born children in immigrant-headed households. Comparing SNAP
participation before and after the adoption of the SAVE program, I do not find a statistically
significant decrease in the SNAP participation among non-citizen adults following the adoption of
the SAVE program. In contrast, the SAVE adoption has a sizable negative impact on the SNAP
participation by US-born children in immigrant households, both for the participation rate (a 14%
decrease) and the total number of participants (an 8% decrease) in a household. The results suggest
that SAVE not only is ineffective in deterring unqualified immigrant applicants but also reduces
take-up among qualified US-born children.
The last chapter studies the driving forces of state anti-illegal immigration legislation passed
since 2005, focusing on a district’s demographic structure. To accomplish this, I compile a novel
dataset of legislative-district-level characteristics and match these data to votes on individual bills
from each state’s house of representatives and senate. I show that districts with a more established
immigrant population and a higher fraction of African Americans tend to vote against anti-illegal
immigration legislation. In contrast to the previous findings, however, districts with a large fraction
of Hispanic population tend to vote for anti-illegal immigration legislation.
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Chapter 1
Statehouses, Schoolhouses, and the
Impact of Hispanic Immigrant Inflows
on Public Education Finance
1.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, the substantial growth of Hispanic immigrant populations and their
second generations continues to be a salient feature in the demographic evolution of the United
States. The share of Hispanic immigrant children in the school-aged population has risen from
around 0% in 1960 to 14% in 2010 (Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2). Hispanic immigrant households’ most
used public benefit is K-12 public education, which accounts for 20% of 2007 state and local spending
(Census of Governments, 2007). Nevertheless, empirical evidence that quantifies the impact of
Hispanic immigrant inflows on K-12 education finance in the U.S. is limited1. One exception is
Coen-Pirani (2011), who uses a political economy framework to calibrate how much immigrants
affected public education spending in California from 1970 to 2000. However, Coen-Pirani (2011)
characterizes public education as essentially a local public good. Specifically, the author does
not take into account state action in his framework. One important role state governments play
in education finance is to redistribute wealth across school districts. Therefore, the impact of
Hispanic immigrant inflows on state and local spending is expected to differ. Since state and local
government each fund roughly 44% of K-12 public education spending ((Figure 1.3), it is important
to investigate how both state and local government respond to Hispanic immigrant inflows in public
education finance.
Hispanic immigrant inflows affect public education finance in two ways. First, they increase
a household’s tax price for public education spending, which gives the amount of extra tax rev-
enue needed in order to yield an extra dollar of spending on education. To be specific, Hispanic
immigrant households have more children per household and they have lower household income to
contribute to the tax base themselves. In addition, Hispanic immigrant children may also require
additional education programs, such as English Language Learners Programs. Second, local and
state governments may endogenously respond to Hispanic immigrant inflows, holding tax price
constant. With these in mind, this paper addresses two questions. First, what is the impact of His-
panic immigrant inflows on the tax price for public education spending? Second, how do state and
1Speciale (2012) uses the 1990s Balkan Wars (in Bosnia and Kosovo) as a source of exogenous variation to identify
the impact of immigrant inflows on public education expenditures in EU-15 countries. He finds the elasticity of
education spending with respect to immigrant population share is -0.15.
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local governments respond to these inflows, and what is the total impact on education spending?
The empirical analysis exploits variation at two geographical levels, states and school districts.
I first exploit state-level variation for the years of 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2007 to evaluate the
long run impact of Hispanic immigrant inflows on public education finance. The key explanatory
variable is measured as the change in the fraction of Hispanic immigrant children in a decade.
To quantify the causal impact, I use an instrumental variable defined as the predicted inflows of
Hispanic immigrant children given the historical settlement of Hispanic immigrants (Card 2001,
Smith 2012, Cascio and Lewis 2012, and Wozniak and Murray 2012). I find that a ten-percentage
point increase in the fraction of Hispanic immigrant children leads to a reduction of current spending
per pupil by 13%, which is equivalent to about $1300 per student, evaluated at the 2010 mean
spending level. I further demonstrate that the negative impact on education spending is mainly
due to state governments’ responses. I then exploit the school-district-level variation for the years
of 1990 and 2000 as a robustness check for state-level analysis. Furthermore, I analyze Texas school
districts in 2000 to demonstrate that local school districts do not negatively respond to immigrant
inflows after accounting for the endogenous resident sorting.
This paper makes several contributions. First, I provide a concrete calculation on one of the
central policy concerns about low-skilled immigrants: what is the fiscal cost associated with low-
skilled immigrants. That is, how much more tax burden do they impose on natives through the
public education system? Second, this paper provides the first empirical evidence on the impact
of Hispanic immigrant inflows on public education spending across states and localities. More
importantly, I recognize the differential responses from state and local governments. Lastly, the
literature has generally found ethnic diversity or growth of immigrant population decreases the
demand for income redistribution (Dahlberg et al. 2012; Magni-Berton 2014). This is the first paper
to investigate immigrants’ impact on the government spending by recognizing the redistributive
nature of state government spending in the setting of public education.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some institutional background
on K-12 public education finance in the U.S. Section 3 discusses the mechanisms through which
Hispanic immigrant inflows impact public education spending. I separate it into a calculation
of direct impact on the education budget constraint and an analytical analysis of government’s
endogenous responses. Section 4 discusses the data. In Section 5, I present the empirical results
and analysis, first concentrating on the state level and then continuing with the school district level.
Finally, I conclude in Section 6.
1.2 K-12 Public Education Finance in the U.S.
The jurisdiction of education finance consists of three levels of government: federal, state, and
local2. All three levels of government contribute to education funding. On average, state and local
government each fund roughly 45 percent of K-12 public education spending across the states. A
2The jurisdiction in the local level is usually the school district. In some states, it is the city or county government.
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little less than 10 percent is from the federal government (Figure 1.3).
The state government (including legislators, governor, and state education agency) determines
and manages state funding and education finance formulas through annual legislative appropriation.
State governments set minimum dollar amount for one student, known as foundation aid3. Based
upon the certified tax roll in the past year, often times, the education committee also computes
and certifies required local tax effort (often known as minimum millage rate or foundation tax
rate) for all school districts. In addition to the required local effort millage levy, each school board
may levy a discretionary current operating discretionary millage up to certain limit. The limit is
usually prescribed annually in the appropriations act. Many states also allow voters to override the
legislative limit.
The state government generally determines the level and distribution of funding, following
different rules and procedures depending on the state.. Table 1.1 shows the distribution of state
spending by category. Spending by general formula accounts for 74.8%. There are various formulae
that are in use. Among these, the most common and basic one is foundation aid formula, in which
the state makes up the difference between the amount of revenue generated by local school districts
and the guaranteed foundation amount. Therefore, state spending is essentially a negative function
of local property wealth per pupil. In states that use a local effort equalization formula4, state
spending is also a function of local tax rate. In short, the roles of state government in education
finance is largely to transfer wealth from richer school districts to poorer districts and to reward
local spending effort.
Local school district spending is determined by school administrators, school boards, school
employees and community members, usually within constraints prescribed by the state legislature.
In certain states, voters in a school district can pass a referendum to override the spending limit
set by states.
The federal government spends more than $40 billion annually on K-12 public education pro-
grams. Much of the funding is set annually by Congress through the appropriations process. Title
I is the largest program of federal spending and funds are typically allocated to school districts
based on child poverty.
In summary, state and local government play different roles in education finance. Throughout
waves of education finance reforms, state governments have played an increasing role in determining
education spending. It is an annual legislative decision by the state government that determines
the various parameters (e.g., minimum education spending and minimum and maximum local tax
rates) in the education finance formula. In certain states, school districts may have limited local
autonomy in the level of education spending. Understanding how governments respond to Hispanic
immigrant inflows in education finance requires investigation on both the aggregate spending and
spending by the state government and the school districts separately.
3Among all states, the foundation system is a commonly adopted education finance formula across states. It is
currently used by 37 states (Hightower et al., 2010), and composes the largest part of state spending.
4In states that adopt this scheme, same tax rates generate the same tax revenue for each school district, regardless
of the district’s own property value per pupil.
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1.3 Mechanisms Through Which Hispanic Immigrant Inflows
Impact Education Finance
Hispanic immigrant inflows could affect public education finance in a number of ways, both di-
rectly through the increase in the tax price of dollar per-pupil spending, and indirectly through
government’s endogenous response in tax rate.
1.3.1 Direct Fiscal Impact: An Increase in the Tax Price of Per-Pupil
Spending
The most direct way that Hispanic immigrant inflows could affect public education spending is
through their impact on the public education budget, specifically, by increasing the tax price of
per-pupil spending. The tax price paid by an individual is defined as the amount of tax an individual
needs to pay in order to raise per-pupil spending by an extra dollar. Assuming education is financed
by an income tax5, the tax price of an individual equals the number of students per household times
the ratio of his income to the average income per household. Let E be the total education spending
and S be the total number of students. Then the per-pupil education spending is e = E/S. Let β
be the percentage of Hispanic immigrant headed households, hi be the total number of households
of immigrant status i, yi be the mean household income for immigrant status i, si be the number of
children per household, y be mean household income, and s be the average number of children per
household. i = I denotes Hispanic immigrants and i = N denotes natives. Therefore, S =
∑
i si ·hi,
total household income Y =
∑
i yi ·hi, and tax price= s · (yi/y). Assume public education spending
is financed by state income tax t. Consider a balanced government budget constraint for school
finance:
e(hI · sI + hN · sN ) = (hI · yI + hN · yN ) · t
Furthermore, Hispanic immigrant children could be more costly to educate. They generally face
special educational or family needs which often require additional programs (e.g., English language
programs). Let ei be the spending per pupil for immigrant status i, then the equation can be
written as:
(β · eI + (1 − β) · eN ) · (β · sI + (1 − β) · sN ) = (β · yI + (1 − β) · yN ) · t
Assuming there are no tax responses from the government (i.e., no change in t), the direct
impact of the inflow of hispanic immigrant children is to increase the tax price of per-pupil spending.
Hispanic immigrant inflows may increase the tax price of per-pupil spending by decreasing s and
increasing y and e.
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 depict the national long-run trend in mean household income (y) and the av-
erage number of school-aged children per household (s) for Hispanic immigrant-headed households
5In practice, a major part of the spending is funded by local property tax. To avoid the endogeneity issue of
housing market, I simplify the problem by considering only income tax.
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and native-headed households respectively. Figure 1.4 shows Hispanic immigrant-headed house-
holds have on average $20,000 dollars lower mean household income than native-headed households.
This gap has been stable for the early decades and widening since the Great Recession when His-
panic immigrants appear to be hit particularly hard during the economic downturn (Orrenius and
Zavodny, 2010). Hispanic immigrant households’ mean income also mirrors the trend of low-skilled
immigrant households. Figure 1.5 shows that on average Hispanic immigrant households have more
school-aged children per household. In 2010, the average number of children per household for His-
panic immigrants was more than double than that of native households. Figure 1.6 shows one
possible reason driving this trend is the lower fertility rate of Native born women, the number of
children born to women aged 18-44 for Hispanic immigrants and natives. Approximately 0.4 fewer
children are born to native women than Hispanic immigrant women. Lastly, Figure 1.7 shows that
the percentage of Hispanic immigrant-headed households (β) increases from 1% to 7% from 1970
to 2010.
Since the gaps of the mean household income and the number of children per household be-
tween immigrant households and native households are relatively constant over years, I evaluate
the impact of Hispanic immigrant inflows on the tax price of education spending based on 2010
values. There is no available data on the actual expenditure on children with different backgrounds,
therefore the difference between eI and eN can not be measured within a school district. To the
extent that Hispanic immigrant children often require additional educational programs (eI > eN ),
the calculation provides a lower bound of the tax price increase due to Hispanic immigrant inflows.
Let the unit of measurement for yi and y be in millions of dollars, an individual i’s tax price of
per-pupil spending e in 2010 is then:
tax price in 2010 = s · (yi/y)
= yi · (βsI + (1 − β)sN )/(βyI + (1 − β)yN )
= yi · (7% ∗ 1 + 93% ∗ 0.5)/(7% ∗ 0.05 + 93% ∗ 0.07)
= yi · 7.79
(1.3.1)
Compared to 1970:
tax price in 1970 = yi · (1% ∗ 1 + 99% ∗ 0.5) · yi/(1% ∗ 0.05 + 99% ∗ 0.07)
= yi · 7.23
(1.3.2)
The simple accounting exercise suggests that the tax price has increased by roughly 7.7% from
1970 to 2010, along with a six percentage point increase in the share of Hispanic immigrant house-
holds. That is, increasing the fraction of Hispanic immigrant household by one percentage point,
the tax price of one dollar per-pupil spending would increase by at least 1.28%.
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1.3.2 Local and State Government Responses in Tax Rates
In addition to the direct fiscal impact, Hispanic immigrant inflows could affect the public education
spending through government’s endogenous responses by changing education-related tax rates.
First, if people exhibit in-group bias in the sense of being more altruistic to one’s own ethnicity,
increased ethnic diversity induced by Hispanic immigrant inflows would lead to reduced support
for redistribution among natives (Dahlberg et al., 2012). In the context of public education, since
state spending is mainly redistributive in its nature, one would expect the negative response to
Hispanic immigrant inflows to be more pronounced among the state governments.
Secondly, as Alesina et al. (1999) suggest, preference polarization (or the heterogeneity of pref-
erences) across ethnic groups decreases support for spending on productive public goods, including
education. If this is the case, the same would be true for other productive public goods.
Lastly, Hispanic immigrant children could be more costly to educate, which further increases the
tax price of education spending. Increased tax prices have income effects: the decreased purchasing
power due to the rise in the tax price of public schooling would lead to reduced spending in
public schooling. They also have substitution effects: richer households have a price incentive to
substitute away from purchases of public school inputs towards purchases of other goods (including
other public goods and private schooling). If this is the case, spending in other public goods may
not necessarily decline following the inflows of Hispanic immigrants.
1.4 Data and Sample Restriction
In this section, I describe the data and define the sample used in the analysis. The study requires
data on education finance, including expenditure and revenues from different levels of governments
and sociodemographic characteristics of the population. The datasets I constructed include both
state level panel data from 1970 to 2007 and school district level panel data from 1990 to 2000.
1.4.1 School-District-Level Demographic Data
The school-district-level demographic data are from two school district datasets, the 1990 Census
School District Special Tabulation and the Census 2000 School District Tabulation. To construct
consistently defined school districts over time for the school districts that have boundary changes,
I use the School District Geographic Reference File 1969-1979 to determine the fraction of each
census tract’s total population inside the borders of each school district in 1970. I then assign these
tracts to the school districts from other years by this population weight.
1.4.2 State-Level Demographic Data
I obtain state level demographic data through tabulation from Census data 1970, 1980, 1990,
2000, and American Community Survey 2008 3-year data. Unlike school district data, Hispanic
immigrant children are identified as those who have at least one Hispanic immigrant parent.
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1.4.3 Education Finance Data
The school-district finance data are constructed from the Historical Database on Individual Gov-
ernment Finances (INDFIN) and Common Core of Data (CCD) School District Finance Survey
(F-33). The INDFIN contains school district finance data annually for independent school dis-
tricts from 1967 to 1991. Beginning with the fiscal year 1989, detailed fiscal data on all public
revenues and expenditures within states for regular pre-kindergarten to grade 12 education has
been collected in National Public Education Financial Survey Data. The detailed differences across
these two datasets are listed in the Appendix. School district finance data is missing for depen-
dent school districts in Census of Government INDFIN data.6 This includes all school districts
in states of Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, and part of school districts in some states
(Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, and Tennessee). I obtain the spending data from their parent
government finance data, usually city government, county government or municipal government.
However, other fiscal outcome variables including state spending and local spending will be missing
for these school districts. I then match the school district finance data with the demographic data
by their education agency id.
State level education finance data are aggregated from the school district level finance data. I
then match the state level finance data with the demographic data by state id.
1.5 State Level Panel Data Analysis: 1970-2007
Having documented the direct fiscal impact of Hispanic immigrant households in public education
finance, I now turn to formal analysis at both the state level and the school district level. The goal
of this section is to isolate the effect on public education spending due to the ethnic compositional
change of population, after controlling for the greater population of children per household and the
lower household income of Hispanic immigrant households.
1.5.1 Empirical Framework and Identification Strategy
The state level analysis presents some advantages. First, Tiebout sorting or any residential sorting
would be less of a concern at the state level. That is, the demographic composition of a state
is less endogenous to public education spending since it is relatively more costly for families to
move across states than across school districts. Second, the main jurisdictions of education consist
of two levels of government: state government and school districts. The state level analysis has
an exact match between the unit of observation, the states, and one of the relevant jurisdictions
for public education spending, the state governments. Lastly, the key explanatory variable in the
school district level is only available since 1990. The availability of state level data spanning a
long period of time allows me to cover the course of modern U.S. immigration, characterized by
different waves of Hispanic immigrants (Card and Lewis, 2007). For example, if one is particularly
6Spending information on dependent school districts are often left out in the school finance literature.
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concerned about the political power immigrants have gained in established immigrant states such
as California and Texas, the variation from earlier decades would still present some story about
immigrants’ impact on public education spending. The analysis is limited to the 48 continental
states. I focus on the years of 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 20077; the year-to-year variation in the
share of immigrant children in the children population exhibits considerable noise and often shows
a mean-reverting feature, thus a low frequency data would guarantee enough sample variation in
the covariate of interest. Additionally, these observations in the outcome variables spanning longer
time periods would allow me to better capture the legislative response as it usually has a lagging
feature. There are a total of 240 state-year observations for most of the variables.8 I present the
summary statistics weighted by state population in Table 1.2. The basic empirical model is to link
the within-state spending variation with the within-state Hispanic immigrant children variation.
Formally,
ln(yst) = γ + βImmigrantsst + ρx
′
st + γt + δs + st. (1.5.1)
The dependent variable is the log of various fiscal outcome variables in state s at time t.
Specifically, I focus on current spending per pupil, state spending per pupil, and local spending per
pupil as the main outcome variables. I focus only on per-pupil current spending for two reasons.
First, per-pupil current spending accounts for the major part of the spending. Second, capital
spending can be fairly lumpy, which means very little has to be spent for several years, followed
by a large increase for some year.9 The key explanatory variable Immigrantsst is defined as the
Hispanic immigrant children over the total children population in state s at time t. I define Hispanic
immigrants as those Hispanics who are born outside of the U.S. I define Hispanic immigrant children
as children who live with at least one Hispanic immigrant parent, regardless of their own immigrant
status.10 δs is the state fixed effects. This accounts for institutional differences that would affect
the education spending but are relatively constant over time. β is interpreted as the percent change
in per-pupil spending corresponding to a change of the Hispanic immigrant children equal to 1%
of the state’s current student population. I estimate the first differenced version of Equation 1.5.1:
∆ln(yst) = γ + β∆Immigrantsst + ρ∆x
′
st + γt + ∆st. (1.5.2)
Changes in the Hispanic immigrant children as a source of variation presents an advantage over the
level of Hispanic immigrant children in that it utilizes variation from different states at different
7I use 2007 instead of 2010 to avoid the confounding effect of the Great Recession (William N. Evans and Wagner,
2014).
8A few states with dependent school districts have missing data for state and local spending for the years of 1970
and 1980. These states include Maryland, North Carolina, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia.
9The analysis on capital spending is not statistically significant and is available upon request.
10This is a more meaningful definition for the fiscal purpose than simply using children who are Hispanic immigrants.
The children of immigrants also affect a country’s fiscal system, both on the revenue and expenditure sides, whether
or not they are immigrants themselves. From a policy perspective, the impacts of immigrant children, US-born or
foreign-born, are contingent upon the initial arrival of the immigrant parents, and thus, arguably, should be included
in a comprehensive analysis of the impact of immigration. Another point is that it is parents’ votes that determine
the level of spending. From this perspective, Hispanic immigrant children are tied to their parents’ limited political
power, even though they themselves sometimes are citizens.
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points in time. For example, in 2007, the largest increase of the Hispanic immigrant children is
no longer clustered in those popular states (see the list of states with largest increase of Hispanic
immigrant children in Table 2.1). The endogeneity of immigrant population location may pose
some threat to identification. Specifically, immigrants may be attracted to areas with good local
labor market conditions. If this is the case, immigrant inflows would be associated with increasing
business income tax revenue. Furthermore, Saiz (2007) shows that immigrant inflows drive up
the housing value. This could therefore increase the tax base in the local spending for education
spending.11 In both cases, immigrant inflows may be associated with higher tax bases, then the
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of β will be upward biased. Another possibility is immigrants
may choose to locate in states with more friendly immigrant policy. If this is the case, the estimated
effect would also be upward biased. To mitigate this endogeneity issue, I employ an instrumental
variable strategy. Following the immigration literature (Card 2001, Smith 2012, Cascio and Lewis
2012, and Wozniak and Murray 2012), the identification strategy exploits the variation in the
historically determined patterns of ethnic settlement within the U.S. and focuses on the period
from 1970 to 2000.
Formally, the first step is to generate a prediction of the change in the number of Hispanic
immigrant children in each state over each decade, given the total Hispanic immigrant children
change in the U.S. over the period and initial settlement patterns by state. Formally, for a state s,
the predicted change in the number of Hispanic immigrant children is:
∆I˜s,t =
∑
e
Is,e,1970
Ie,1970
∆Ie,t,t−1,
where ∆Ie,t,t−1 is the change in the total number of Hispanic immigrant children in all areas from
year t − 1 to year t, and Is,e,1970 is the Hispanic immigrant population in state s in 1970. I then
convert ∆I˜s,t to predicted change in immigrant share:
IV =
∆I˜s,t
Total Childrens,t−1 + ∆I˜s,t
− Is,t−1
Total Childrens,t−1
.
The second instrumental variable is the change in immigrant stocks in an area by the area’s
distance to Mexico (in miles) interacted with the inflow of Mexican immigrants into the country
(excluding inflows into area z).
∆Iˆzt = Dz × inflowMexican−z,t,t−1
The identification assumption for this instrument is that a large national inflow of Mexicans has a
larger effect on education spending in areas closer to the US-Mexico border only through its effects
on the actual change in the number of Hispanic immigrants in the area. This instrument identifies
the effects of Hispanic immigration using variation in predicted Mexican immigration. Hence, to
the extent that Mexican immigration has different effects on the else educated US labor market,
11A major source of local tax revenue for education spending is property tax revenue.
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two-stage lease squares (2SLS) results using this instrument may vary from the first one (which use
variation in predicted immigration across all ethnic groups).
1.5.2 Summary Statistics
The control variables to account for the direct fiscal impact are the mean household income and
the share of children in the population. To better capture the income change caused by Hispanic
immigrant inflows, I also include the percentage of the population who live under the poverty line
as a control variable. To control for other factors that affect the education spending, I include the
following variables: the percentage of the population aged 25 or over who have a college degree or
higher, the percentage of the population aged over 65, the percentage of the population who reside
in urban areas, the percentage of the population who are black, and income inequality measured
as the ratio of mean household income relative to median household income. Literature suggests
the elderly population also affect the public education spending (Poterba 1997, Harris et al. 2001).
Other factors that are likely to influence the education finance are the judicial factors. Specifically,
I include the dummy variable for court cases: court case equals to 1 if there has been a court case
in the state that overturned the preexisting school finance system, and equals to 0 otherwise. The
table demonstrates a substantial variation in the share of the Hispanic immigrant children and
fiscal outcome variables across states over the years.
1.5.3 Correlation Between Changes in Immigrant Share and Changes in
Education Spending in the State Level
Figures 1.10 and 1.11 show the negative correlation between changes in the fraction of Hispanic
immigrant children and changes in per-pupil spending. Figure 1.10 plots within-state changes of
the immigrant share from 1990 to 2000 against the corresponding changes in per-pupil education
spending. It demonstrates the considerable variation across states in the changes of Hispanic
immigrant children shares. In 2000, the highest growth of Hispanic immigrant children was not
clustered in historical immigrant states such as California or Texas (Card and Lewis, 2007). This
suggests that the results are not driven by a selected group of states. Since there were secular
increases in per-pupil spending over the period under study, the more precise way to explain the
negative correlation is that it suggests per-pupil spending rose less rapidly in states that experienced
immigrant population growth over the period in question. Figure 1.11 shows a similar relationship
for the period between 2000 and 2007. For the years of 2000 and 2007, the changes of Hispanic
immigrant children are even more scattered. Table 2.1 shows the top 10 states with the largest
increase in Hispanic immigrant children.
1.5.4 First-Stage Estimates and Credibility of Instrumental Variables
The identification strategy relies on the assumptions that the instrument is related to changes in
the actual presence of Hispanic immigrant children in a state and is uncorrelated with other factors
10
that might have affected the public education spending per pupil.
Table 1.7 presents evidence for the validity of these assumptions. Panel A presents a strong
first-stage relationship between the instruments and the change in each state’s Hispanic immigrant
children in my baseline specification. To investigate the second identifying assumption, Panel B of
Table 1.7 shows that the instrument is not related to the pre-existing trend in revenue per pupil,
which is measured as the change from 1960 to 1970. Some Hispanic immigrant inflows were already
occurring in the 1960s, so some level of negative pre-trend in spending is expected. The point
estimate of pre-trend is, however, not statistically significant. Panel C presents the results for
the overidentification tests. The results suggest that we do no reject the null hypothesis that the
instruments are valid.
1.5.5 State Level First-Differenced Estimation
Table 1.4 presents OLS and 2SLS estimates of the impact of Hispanic immigrant inflows on public
education current spending per pupil. The coefficients presented in the table are estimates of β
and ρ, with standard errors clustered at the state level provided in parentheses. The dependent
variable in Table 1.4 is the change in the log of current spending per pupil. The endogenous
explanatory variable is the change in the share of Hispanic immigrant children in the population
aged 5-17 in each state between 1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2007. The standard
control variables are included in all specifications.
Columns 1-6 of Table 1.4 present the OLS estimation results. Overall, changes in the Hispanic
immigrant children share are negatively associated with public education current spending. How-
ever, they are not statistically significant after accounting for income distribution and the fraction
of school-aged in the total population (columns 4-6). The coefficient of the Hispanic immigrant
children variable increases in absolute value when the mean household income is added (column
2). The larger magnitude of the coefficient confirms the hypothesis that immigrant inflows are en-
dogenous to economic conditions. Even though immigrants themselves have lower mean household
income, the mean aggregate income in each state appears to be positively associated with Hispanic
immigrant inflows. The fact that Hispanic immigrant inflows lower the tax base appears to be
better captured by adding the poverty rate. After accounting for the poverty rate (column 3), the
immigrant effect is not significant and the point estimate is much smaller in magnitude compared
to columns 1 and 2.
Columns 7-12 of Table 1.4 present the instrumental variable estimation results. The estimates
of the Hispanic immigrant effect are overall consistent with the OLS estimates. The coefficient
in column 7 suggests the magnitude of the total Hispanic immigrant impact, that is, including
the direct fiscal impact and the indirect government responses due to Hispanic immigrant inflows.
An increase of ten percentage points in the fraction of Hispanic immigrant children is estimated to
reduce current spending per pupil by about thirteen percent, which amounts to $1300 per pupil. The
estimated larger magnitude compared to the OLS estimation results in Table 1.4 again confirms the
hypothesis that Hispanic immigrant inflows are endogenous and that the OLS estimation attenuates
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the effect. Indeed, the coefficient is reduced in absolute value when the mean household income is
added (column 2). These imply the instrumental variable is effective in mitigating the endogeneity
of immigrant inflows with respect to the economic conditions. The estimated elasticity on the share
of school-aged children is around -1 in column 4 and 10. However, the estimated elasticity decreases
to -0.7 after accounting for mean household income and the poverty rate (column 6 and 12). This
suggests that the fraction of school-aged children is positively correlated with education spending
per capita. An increase in the fraction of school-aged children does not lead to a proportional
decrease in per-pupil spending.
Column 12 presents the net Hispanic immigrant effect on the public education spending, after
accounting for income distribution and average number of children per household. The difference
between estimates in columns 7 and 12 account for the impact only due to the mean household
income and the average number of children per household. The lower household income and the
greater number of children per household due to Hispanic immigrant inflows are estimated to reduce
the current spending per pupil by about 7 percent. As the share of Hispanic immigrant children has
increased from about 2% in 1970 to 14% in 2007, an increase of 12 percentage points, the current
spending per pupil has decreased by about 8.4% due to lower household income and greater number
of children per household induced by Hispanic immigrant inflows. This estimate is fairly close to
the lower bound estimate of 7.7% suggested by the accounting calculation in Section 3. Accounting
for the income and total children per household, there is still evidence showing decreasing political
support for education due to Hispanic immigrant inflows. This impact is about half of the size
of the total Hispanic immigrant impact. An increase of ten percentage points in the fraction of
Hispanic immigrant children is estimated to reduce current spending per pupil by about 7 percent.
Overall, the results in Table 1.4 provide some suggestive evidence on the negative impact of
Hispanic immigrant inflows on public education spending per pupil. Since state and local govern-
ments serve very different roles in education finance and they both account for roughly 44% of
the education spending (Figure 1.3), it is instructive to break down the analysis into spending by
different levels of governments rather than focus only on the aggregate spending.
Table 1.5 reports the first-differenced analysis of Equation 1.5.2 on state spending per pupil.
The dependent variable in Table 1.5 is the change in the log of state spending per pupil. The results
are fairly consistent between the OLS and the 2SLS estimations. The coefficient of aggregate mean
household income is positive and statistically significant. This implies that a state’s fiscal capacity
is associated with the level of state spending on education. The point estimate on the share of the
children population is negative. However, the estimate is not statistically significant. This suggests
the number of children do not have predicting power on education spending by state governments.
When the income level and the share of children are added, the coefficient on the poverty rate
is positive (columns 6 and 12). This is consistent with the fact that state government spending
aims to ensure that children from poor school districts have equal access to education. In states
with higher poverty rates, the state government needs to spend more to make up the difference
between the minimum spending and spending by the school districts. On average, an increase of
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ten percentage points in the fraction of Hispanic immigrant children is estimated to reduce state
spending per pupil by about 30% to 40% or about $1650 to $2200 evaluated at the 2010 spending
level.
Table 1.6 presents the first-differenced analysis of Equation 1.5.2 on local spending per pupil.
The instrumental variable estimation results suggest that states with a larger fraction of Hispanic
immigrant children tend to spend more local funding in education. The Hispanic immigrant effect
estimates are positive for all specifications, although some of the estimates are not statistically
significant. The positive relationship could be due to two reasons. First, residents generally have
stronger support for local public goods spending than state spending as the latter is often redis-
tributional. For example, Harris et al. (2001) finds that the elderly’s support for public school
spending is stronger at the local level than it is at the state level. Additionally, it is also possible
that state government require a larger minimum spending at the local level in states that expe-
rience large inflows of Hispanic immigrant inflows. Compared to state spending, local spending
also appears to be more elastic to the mean household income, the poverty rate, and the average
number of children per household. This suggests that local spending in education is more sensitive
to the fiscal capacity of an area rather than other political factors.
Table B.1 presents the first-differenced analysis of Equation 1.5.2 on federal spending per pupil.
Point estimate on Hispanic immigrant effect from instrumental variable estimation is positive. How-
ever, it is not statistically significant. Table B.2 presents the first-differenced analysis of Equation
1.5.2 using two instrumental variables in separate estimations.
In summary, the results imply that state spending, the redistribution part of education spending,
accounts for the decrease of education spending per pupil. While some evidence suggests an increase
of local spending in education in states with large inflows of Hispanic immigrants, the net impact
of Hispanic immigrant inflows on aggregate spending appears to be negative. Although state
aid has experienced a secular increase over time due to waves of education finance reforms, the
consistently estimated results across specifications demonstrate that areas with larger inflows of
Hispanic immigrant children have much slower growth in state aid per pupil.
1.6 School District Level Analysis: 1990-2000
This section presents school district level analysis, which complements the state-level analysis by
exploiting rich within-school-district variation. The school district level analysis provides the exact
match between the unit of observation and the relevant jurisdiction for the education spending
determined by the local government.
The variation utilized in this section is within-school-district changes from 1990 to 2000. Com-
pared to state level analysis, school district level analysis would take advantage of rich cross-sectional
variation by expanding the number of observations. The drawback of school district analysis, how-
ever, is that there are only two years data available for the main explanatory variable: the share of
Hispanic immigrant children in the population aged 5-17. With these in mind, the school district
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level analysis is considered as a robustness check to the state level analysis. I estimate a similar
empirical model as in the state analysis (Equation 1.5.1), but the unit of analysis here is the school
district. The basic model is the following:
ln(ydt) = γ + βImmigrantsdt + ρx
′
dt + σd + γt + dt. (1.6.1)
Differencing Equation 1.6.1:
∆ln(ydt) = γ + β∆Immigrantsdt + ρ∆x
′
dt + γt + ∆dt. (1.6.2)
The analysis exploits within-district (over time) variation in changing Hispanic immigrant chil-
dren that can not be explained by economy-wide shocks to demographics or education spending
levels. Time fixed effects account for the spending change due to macroeconomic changes. School
district fixed effects (σd) are differenced out for the first-differenced analysis. State-year fixed effects
are not included in the analysis due to the following reasons. First, state-year fixed effects control
for those state-wide year-specific factors that could affect the education spending. These include
annual legislative appropriations that determine parameters within the education finance formula.
Since the appropriations are endogenous and account for a large fraction of education spending
variation, including the state-year fixed effects in the analysis would make the estimates hard to
interpret. Second, when state-year fixed effects are not included, the analysis is considered as a
parralell analysis with the state level. The analysis identifies the impact of Hispanic immigrant
inflows on education spending across states.
The endogeneity due to residential sorting of native households poses a threat to the identifica-
tion in the school district level analysis. Specifically, families are more likely to sort across school
districts based on their preferred level of local public goods spending, as suggested by Tiebout
(1956). If that is the case, the estimated negative relationship is due to the dynamic Tiebout sort-
ing process, rather than the inflows of immigrant children having any direct impact on education
spending decisions. The OLS estimation would then overestimate the Hispanic immigrant impact.
To address the endogeneity issue, the analysis employs an instrumental variable strategy similar to
that of the state level. The identification strategy exploits the variation in the historically deter-
mined patterns of ethnic settlement within a state and focuses on the period from 1990 to 2000. To
construct the instrumental variable, the first step is to generate a prediction of the change in the
number of Hispanic immigrant children in the school districts from 1990 to 2000, given the total
Hispanic immigrant children inflow over the period and initial settlement patterns. Formally, for a
school district d within state s, the predicted change in the number of Hispanic immigrant children
is:
∆I˜d,s,t =
∑
e
Id,s,e,1970
Is,e,1970
∆Is,e,t,t−1
where Ie,s,t,t−1 is the change in the total number of Hispanic immigrant children in all areas within
a state s from year t− 1 to year t, Is,e,1970 is the Hispanic immigrant population in school district
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d. I then convert ∆I˜e,t to predicted change in immigrant share:
IV =
∆I˜e,s,t
Total Childrene,s,t−1 + ∆I˜e,s,t
− Ie,s,t−1
Total Childrene,s,t−1
.
Table 1.11 presents the school district level analysis of Equation 1.6.2 on state spending per
pupil, local spending per pupil, and current spending per pupil for the years of 1990 and 2000.
The results are fairly consistent with the state level analysis. They demonstrate that immigrant
inflows result in a shift of the fiscal responsibility: state aid decreases due to lower demand for
redistribution while local governments spend more in response to the decrease of state aid. After
taking into account both state and local government spending, the overall impact is still negative.
Even though school district level analysis provides the match between the unit of observation
and the jurisdiction for local spending, R2 (column 1) is small. Adding state spending per pupil
in the analysis (column 2) increases R2 to 0.28. Since about 75% of state spending is general
formula spending, the larger R2 suggests that the changing education formula parameters explain
much more of the variation in changing spending within a school district than the changing fiscal
capacity or the demographic composition of a school district. Comparing the results in columns 1
and 2, it also suggests that part of the increasing local spending is indeed due to the lower state
spending associated with immigrant inflows.
1.7 A Cross-Sectional Analysis on Texas School Districts: 2000
Thus far, inferences have been drawn from comparisons across states. The purpose of this section
is to compare education spending across school districts within a specific state. I focus on Texas
for two reasons. First, it is a state with a large share of Hispanic immigrant children, which
would provide enough variation in the share of Hispanic immigrant children across school districts
to exploit. Second, many states have undergone an extreme version of spending equalization,
leaving almost no fiscal autonomy for school districts12. However, Texas still has considerable local
autonomy for education spending. Since I focus on only one state, one can not draw inferences on
local school districts’ behavioral response to their state governments. Additionally, the spending
differences across state governments would not be accounted for. Instead, the analysis focus on
how local school districts respond to Hispanic immigrant inflows, within the state of Texas.
Table 1.12 presents the cross-sectional analysis of Equation 1.6.2 on the log of property wealth
per pupil (columns 1 and 2) and the log of property tax rate (columns 3 to 8). Consistent with the
state-level analysis, the fiscal capacity accounts for a large proportion of Hispanic immigrant effect
at the local level. Column 1 shows that areas with a high fraction of Hispanic immigrant children
12Take Florida as an example, there are tremendous sources of revenue from school districts, but the fact that every
districts taxed at the board discretionary tax rate limit and only a couple of districts have passed votes to override
the board tax limit essentially indicates school districts do not have much fiscal autonomy in school spending. In fact,
the only variation comes from the 0.51 millage levy that is not equalized. California’s both minimum and maximum
tax rate set at 10 millage indicates the same story.
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are associated with lower property value per pupil. However, the negative relationship vanishes
when the mean household income and the fraction of school-aged children are added (column 2).
This suggests that the lower property value per pupil is due to the fact that Hispanic immigrant
households tend to be poor and have more children each household. Column 3 suggests that areas
with a high fraction of Hispanic immigrant children tend to have lower property tax rate. Further
examination (columns 4 and 5) show that it is mainly driven by areas in the 10th percentile of the
Hispanic immigrant children distribution from non-metropolitan areas. Applying the instrumental
variable estimation (column 6), the negative effect disappears. This suggests that the negative
effect at a school district level is mainly driven by residential sorting.
In summary, at the local school district level, school districts do not appear to negatively respond
to Hispanic immigrant inflows after accounting for endogenous residential sorting.
1.7.1 Discussions
Hispanic Immigrants’ Political Participation
To examine Hispanic immigrants’ political participation, Figure 1.8 presents the trend of the per-
centage of Hispanic immigrants who are naturalized citizens. Since only naturalized citizens are
eligible to vote, a majority (about 70%) of the Hispanic immigrants do not have voting rights.
The citizenship composition of Hispanic immigrants is also relatively stable over time. Figure 1.9
shows the trend of the voting turnout of Hispanic naturalized citizens from 1994 to 201013. Note
that Hispanic immigrant voter turnout is even lower during midterm election years. These are the
years that elect the state legislatures and local officials, who determine the education spending and
approve the budget. Given the low political participation of Hispanic immigrants, the estimated
negative response in education spending is reflective of other citizens’ decreased support for public
education spending rather than immigrants’ preferences towards education spending.
Hispanic Immigrant Inflows and Other Public Goods Spending
Table 1.13 presents both OLS and 2SLS estimation on the relationship between Hispanic immigrant
inflows and other state government fiscal outcomes. It demonstrates that other spending per capita
does not fall due to Hispanic immigrant inflows, while tax revenue per capita does decrease. This
suggests that the mechanism of polarization of preferences proposed by Alesina et al. (1999) is not
the main driving force for the decrease of public education spending.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I find that an increase of ten percentage points in the share of Hispanic immigrant
children are estimated to reduce per-pupil current spending by 13%. Lower household income
and more children per household by Hispanic immigrant households account for about half of the
13Data source: Current Population Survey
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Hispanic immigrant effect. After accounting for the household income and the average number of
children per household, an increase of ten percentage points in the share of Hispanic immigrant
children are estimated to reduce per-pupil current spending by 7%. The negative response to
Hispanic immigrant inflows is due to leveling down of the state spending, characterized by a decrease
of state aid. Some evidence suggests local spending increases in response to the decrease in state
aid. Hungerman (2005) shows that church activities substitute for government activities due to
decreased non-citizens’ access to public services following a provision of the 1996 welfare reform. In
the setting of public education, local government spending effort does not appear to fully substitute
the decrease in state aid.
Since a majority of states have undergone various education equalization reforms across school
districts, there is limited variation across school districts from which to draw inferences. My
future research would examine the resource disparity at a more disaggregated level, the school
level. Another limitation of this paper is it does not distinguish the response to undocumented
immigrants and legal immigrants. Nationally, unauthorized immigrants made up about a quarter
of the foreign-born population (26%) in 2012. Among immigrants who are not naturalized citizens,
about half of them are undocumented (Passel et al., 2014).
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Figure 1.1: Growth of Foreign-born Hispanic Immigrant Children Populations
Figure 1.2: Growth of Foreign-born Hispanic Immigrant Children Populations
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Figure 1.3: State and Local Account for a Majority of the Education Spending
Figure 1.4: Trends for Average Household Income (2010 Thousand Dollars)
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Figure 1.5: Trends for Average Number of School-Aged Children Per Household
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Figure 1.6: Trends for Fertility Rate
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Figure 1.7: The Fraction of Households Headed by Immigrants
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Figure 1.8: A Majority of Hispanic Immigrants are Non-Citizens
Figure 1.9: Voter Turnout of Hispanic Naturalized Citizens are Lower than Other Citizens
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Figure 1.10: Changes in Per-Pupil Spending V.S. Changes in Immigrant Children Share: 1990-2000
Figure 1.11: Changes in Per-Pupil Spending V.S. Changes in Immigrant Children Share: 2000-2007
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Table 1.1: State Spending Distribution in 2000 by
Category (State Average)
Category Percentage Rank
General Formula Spending 74.8% 1
Special Education Programs 4.7% 2
Employee Benefit 3.1% 3
Capital Outlay 2.8% 4
Transportation Programs 1.8% 5
Bilingual Education Programs 0.1% unknown
Note: State spending per pupil in 2000 is $4950.6 in
2010 dollars. Source: School District Finance Survey
F-33 Fiscal Year 1999-2000.
Table 1.2: State Level Summary Statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
State Revenue Per Pupil 4345.48 1742.00 483.84 14173.8
Local Revenue Per Pupil 4164.13 2033.30 968.86 11,474.56
Current Spending Per Pupil 7291.19 2552.04 2,972.70 16,629.78
% Hispanic Immigrant Children 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.33
Mean Household Income 62688.75 12515.76 36,398.26 98,761.48
Mean/Voter Median 1.23 0.08 1.09 1.41
Poverty 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.37
% School Aged 0.21 0.04 0.16 0.32
% Black 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.37
% Old 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.18
% College 0.19 0.07 0.06 0.38
% Urban 0.66 0.18 0.00 0.95
NOTE: The sample consists of 240 observations with 48 continental states
from 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2007. It is weighted by state student pop-
ulation size. Mean/Voter Median is the ratio of the state mean household
income and eligible voter household median income.
Sources: Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and American Community Survey
2008 3-year. Census of Governments 1972, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2007.
Table 1.3: The Top 10 States with Largest Increase in the
Fraction of Hispanic Immigrant Children 2000-2007 and
1990-2000
Rank State Percentage State Percentage
1 Nevada 6.6% Nevada 12.2%
2 Arizona 4.6% California 8.1%
3 Colorado 4.5% Arizona 7.6%
4 Delaware 4.4% Texas 6.4%
5 Utah 4.2% Florida 6.3%
6 Georgia 4.0% Colorado 5.4%
7 North Carolina 3.7% New Jersey 5.4%
8 New Mexico 3.6% New York 5.0%
9 Oregon 3.6% Oregon 4.7%
10 Nebraska 3.3% New Mexico 4.6%
Sources: Census 1990, 2000, and ACS 2006-2008 3-year.
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Table 1.7: Are the Identification Assumptions Satisfied?
Panel A: First Stage Regression
% Hispanic Immigrant Children
IV 0.53***
(0.05) F-test: 29.72
Panel B: Falsification Test: 1960-1970
Current Spending State Spending Local Spending
IV -3.71 -2.88 -4.92 -3.39 -3.00
(2.65) (3.37) (2.98) (3.46) (2.68)
Excluding CA yes yes
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Panel C: Overidentification Test
Current Spending State Spending Local Spending
p-value 0.71 0.22 0.39
NOTE: *significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level
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Table 1.8: First-Differenced 2SLS State Level Estimation on Per-pupil Current
Spending: (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2007)
Dependent Variable: Current Spending Per Pupil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Foreign-Born Hispanic Children -1.30*** -1.31*** -0.60* -0.68* -0.65*
(0.35) (0.28) (0.35) (0.40) (0.39)
ln(Mean Household Income) 1.16*** 0.68*** 0.65***
(0.13) (0.23) (0.23)
Mean/Voter Median 0.23 0.52 0.47
(0.34) (0.34) (0.37)
% Poverty -2.43*** -0.55 -0.63
(0.41) (0.58) (0.60)
% School Aged -3.45*** -3.47***
(0.83) (0.83)
Other Controls X X X X X
Court Cases X
Observations 192 192 192 192 192
R-squared 0.44 0.64 0.57 0.69 0.69
NOTE: The unit of analysis is the 48 continental states. The dependent variables are in log-
arithm. All variables are first-differenced. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
All specifications are clustered at the state level. Other control variables include percentage
of old population, percentage of black population, percentage of college educated, and per-
centage of urban population. Mean/Voter Median is the ratio between the mean household
income and the median household income for household heads who are eligible to vote. Court
cases equals to 1 if there has been a course case in the state that overturned the preexisting
school finance system, and equals to 0 otherwise.
* at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.
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Table 1.9: First-Differenced 2SLS State Level Estimation on Per-pupil Fiscal Out-
come Variables: (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: State Spending Per Pupil
% Foreign-Born Hispanic Children -2.86*** -2.78*** -2.63** -3.41** -3.20**
(1.02) (1.04) (1.09) (1.46) (1.37)
ln(Mean Household Income) 0.68*** 1.37** 1.11**
(0.26) (0.58) (0.55)
Mean/Voter Median -0.12 -0.50 -0.86
(0.82) (0.83) (0.93)
% Poverty -0.77 2.31 1.67
(0.95) (1.69) (1.69)
% School Aged 0.52 0.40
(2.33) (2.25)
Observations 178 178 178 178 178
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.19
Panel B: Local Spending Per Pupil
% Foreign-Born Hispanic Children 1.02 1.40 2.79** 3.17* 3.15*
(1.33) (1.36) (1.39) (1.64) (1.67)
ln(Mean Household Income) 1.99*** 0.41 0.44
(0.42) (1.00) (1.01)
Mean/Voter Median -0.69 0.22 0.24
(1.11) (1.32) (1.29)
% Poverty -5.49*** -3.90 -3.75
(1.04) (2.40) (2.38)
% School Aged -5.35*** -5.32***
(1.84) (1.82)
Observations 172 172 172 172 172
R-squared 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25
Other Controls X X X X X
Court Cases X
NOTE: The unit of analysis is the 48 continental states. The dependent variables are in log-
arithm. All variables are first-differenced. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
All specifications are clustered at the state level. Other control variables include percentage
of old population, percentage of black population, percentage of college educated, and per-
centage of urban population. Mean/Voter Median is the ratio between the mean household
income and the median household income for household heads who are eligible to vote. Court
cases equals to 1 if there has been a course case in the state that overturned the preexisting
school finance system, and equals to 0 otherwise.
* at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.
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Table 1.10: Validity of School-District Level Instrumental Variable
VARIABLES School-District level IV County level IV
% Urban in 1970 0.0820*** 0.0420***
(0.0149) (0.00525)
% Black in 1970 -0.109 -0.107***
(0.0721) (0.0251)
Median Family Income in 1970 -4.55e-06 -1.47e-05***
(3.65e-06) (1.29e-06)
% College in 1970 -0.233 0.0750
(0.334) (0.118)
Observations 4,203 4,205
R-squared 0.009 0.056
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE: The unit of analysis is the school district level. State-fixed effects are included.
* at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.
Table 1.11: First-Differenced School-District Level Estimation on Per-pupil Fiscal Out-
come Variables: (1990 and 2000)
VARIABLES Local Revenue State Revenue Current Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: First Differenced
% Foreign-Born Hispanic Children 1.01*** 0.78*** -0.62*** -0.20*
(0.19) (0.18) (0.23) (0.11)
Observations 11,914 11,909 11,962 11,968
R-squared 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.19
Panel B: IV in School-District Level
% Foreign-Born Hispanic Children 2.55*** 1.54*** -2.76*** -0.58*
(0.47) (0.52) (0.73) (0.33)
Observations 9,322 9,320 9,343 9,345
R-squared 0.07 0.28 0.04 0.18
State Revenue Per Pupil X
NOTE: The dependent variables are in logarithm. The unit of analysis is school districts. All
specifications are clustered at the school district level. All regressions are weighted by chil-
dren population size. State year specific effects are not included. Control variables include log
of the state mean household income, percentage of school aged children, percentage of elderly
population, percentage of black population, percentage of college educated, percentage of ur-
ban population, and mean housing value. * at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level;
***significant at the 1% level.
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Table 1.12: Cross-Sectional Analysis of Texas School Districts in 2000
VARIABLES Property Value Per Pupil Property Tax Rate (Millage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
%Hispanic Immigrant Children -0.80*** 0.27 -0.06** -0.11** -0.04 0.09
(0.20) (0.20) 0.03 (0.04) (0.06) (0.31)
ln(Mean Household Income) 1.09*** 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.02
(0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08)
%School Aged -3.97*** -0.04 -0.21 -0.19 -0.35
(0.88) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.26)
Other Controls X X X X
Non Metro Areas X X X
Excluding 10th Percentile X
IV at County Level X
Observations 972 972 972 559 513 558
R-squared 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02
NOTE: The dependent variables are in logarithm. The unit of analysis is school districts. The
millage rate is only for current spending. Millage rate is the rate at which property taxes are levied
on property. A mill is 1/1000 of a dollar. Control variables include percentage of old population,
percentage of black population, percentage of college educated, private education enrollment rate.
* at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.
Table 1.13: State Government Other Spending, Tax Revenue Per Capita
VARIABLES
Other Spending
Per Capita
Tax Revenue
Per Capita
Total Revenue
Per Capita
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
% Hispanic Immigrant Children -1.11 -0.14 -1.31*** -1.24** -1.41*** -0.93*
(0.72) (0.48) (0.44) (0.57) (0.47) (0.56)
ln(Mean Household Income) 0.91*** 0.84*** 1.00*** 0.99*** 0.37 0.34
(0.15) (0.16) (0.21) (0.22) (0.25) (0.25)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192
R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.74
NOTE: The dependent variables are in logarithm. The unit of analysis is the states.
* at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of the SAVE Program on
Immigrants’ Participation in the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program
2.1 Introduction
The above quote has been the sentiment shared by many states with increased undocumented
immigrant inflows over the past decade. States are concerned with fraudulent welfare claims by im-
migrants who are unqualified due to their immigrant status and the increased fiscal cost. One of the
centerpieces in state-level immigrant-related legislation is to strengthen the welfare screening pro-
cess in order to prevent fraudulent claims by unqualified immigrant welfare recipients. Researchers
have found that the stricter welfare screening process reduces welfare participation among immi-
grants. For example, Sommers (2010) shows that a citizenship documentation requirement for
Medicaid applicants reduced Medicaid enrollment among non-citizens and did not significantly af-
fect citizens. However, the stricter immigrant-related policy also comes with a cost. For example,
Watson (2014) finds that increased immigration enforcement reduces Medicaid participation among
children of non-citizens. Researchers find that the welfare take-up rate (participation rate among
those who are eligible) among US-born children living in immigrant-headed households is partic-
ularly low (Currie 2004, Bertrand et al. 2000). This paper investigates how the adoption of one
common screening process, the mandatory use of the Systematic Alien Verification of Entitlement
(SAVE) program, affects participation of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).
I focus on two relevant groups: US-born children living with immigrant parents (referred to as
“second generation immigrant children” hereafter) and childless immigrant adults. Past research
has focused on the Medicaid participation. However, as Figure 2.1 shows, immigrant children have
surpassed US-born children with native parents (referred to as “native children” hereafter) in Med-
icaid participation, possibly due to substantial outreach efforts. In contrast, SNAP participation
among immigrant children is still significantly lower than native children(Figure 2.2). Additionally,
the near-universal demographic eligibility feature of SNAP makes it better isolate the effect of
SAVE from the effect of the Great Recession on welfare participation. Therefore, in this paper, I
focus on SNAP instead of Medicaid.
By comparing SNAP participation before and after the adoption of the SAVE program, the
decrease in SNAP participation among childless non-citizen adults (unqualified immigrants) is not
statistically significant. This suggests fraudulent claims by undocumented immigrants prior to
the SAVE adoption are likely negligible. As an unintended consequence, however, I find that the
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adoption of SAVE has a negative impact on the SNAP participation among immigrant children.
This paper speaks to one of the central immigration policy concerns: balancing the goal of
restricting undocumented immigrants or their public benefit access and protecting the well-being
of their second generations. On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced a series of execu-
tive actions to prioritize deporting felons not families, allowing certain undocumented immigrants
to temporarily stay in the U.S. without fear of deportation. One action includes “allowing par-
ents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents to request deferred action and employment
authorization for three years” provided that they meet certain conditions. This paper suggests
any immigration policy should take caution with their potential impact on immigrants’ second
generation.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Systematic Alien Verification of Entitlement Program
The Systematic Alien Verification of Entitlement (SAVE) program is an intergovernmental initiative
designed to help federal, state, and local government agencies check immigration status when
granting public benefits and licenses to applicants and for other lawful purposes. The SAVE
Program has access to immigration status information from more than 100 million records contained
in the Department of Homeland Security databases. By determining the immigration status of the
benefit applicants, SAVE helps authorized agencies ensure that only qualified immigrant applicants
receive federal, state, or local public benefits and licenses. The SAVE program, however, does not
indicate whether a person is eligible for a particular benefit. A benefit agency still has to determine
whether the immigrant is eligible for a particular benefit, given the immigrant’s legal status and
other eligibility criteria. A public benefit agency makes an inquiry through SAVE after completing
document examination procedures. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services responds within
a few days, indicating the immigration status of a public benefit applicant.
The adoption of the SAVE program in verifying immigrant status for public benefit applicants
dates back to the 1996 federal welfare law Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act (PRWORA). The law requires state and local agencies to verify the immigration
status of all applicants for federal public benefits. States have received waivers from the SAVE pro-
gram if they have another effective verification method or the cost of using SAVE would outweigh
the savings. I use agency verification inquiry data requested through Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) to determine the SAVE adoption date. Specifically, if a state agency makes more than one
immigrant status request through SAVE in a fiscal year, I code the state as the SAVE program
user and vice versa. Up to now, all the states have registered for the SAVE program in granting
the public benefit studied in this paper except Washington.1 Because the verification data are only
available from 2004, I do not observe the timing of the SAVE adoption if a state adopted SAVE
1The state of Washington has received a waiver from the requirements to use SAVE for verification of benefit
eligibility.
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before 2004. I therefore compare the participation in states that adopted before 2004 (early states)
and after 2004 (late states). Table 2.1 lists the states that adopt the SAVE program after 2004
and their estimated number of undocumented immigrants. Most of these states do not have a large
amount of undocumented immigrants. They received waivers for SAVE in earlier years because the
cost of implementing it is larger than the savings.
2.2.2 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and Access by Immigrant
Status
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as the Food Stamp program,
provides food-purchasing assistance for low-income people living in the U.S. It is fully funded by
the federal government except for 50% of the administrative costs. I focus on the SNAP program
to study the effect of SAVE for the following reasons. First, SNAP is the only program with
almost universal demographic eligibility. It covers all family types and all age groups. Since the
period I study overlaps with the Great Recession, this near-universal demographic eligibility allows
all demographic groups to benefit similarly from the expansion of SNAP during recession years2.
Therefore, compared to the other big programs such as Medicaid, the analysis on SNAP can better
isolate the effect of SAVE from the effect of the Great Recession on welfare participation. Second,
in terms of expenditure, SNAP is the second largest means-tested program after Medicaid. The cost
was $76.4 billion in fiscal year 2013 and supplied roughly 47.6 million Americans (USDA, 2014).
Third, as Figure 2.1 and 2.2 show, US-born children with immigrant parents have caught up with
their participation in Medicaid, possibly due to the substantial outreach efforts. In contrast, SNAP
participation among immigrants is still significantly lower than their native counterpart.
Different categories of immigrants are defined as follows. Immigrants are defined as those who
are foreign-born and who are not born of American parents. Immigrants include both naturalized
citizens and non-citizens. Naturalized citizens are those who are immigrants and later acquire citi-
zenship of the U.S. Non-citizens include Lawful Permanent Residence (LPRs), refugee, temporary
visa holders (F-1 students, H-1B workers, etc.), and undocumented immigrants. Table 2.2 lists the
federal laws regarding immigrant eligibility for SNAP. There are some major eligibility changes for
different immigrant status: 1996 PROWA and 1998 and 2002 farm bills. To the extent that these
changes are the eligibility changes that affect all states, this macro shock will be absorbed in year
effects in all specifications.
In addition to the federal laws on immigrants’ eligibility for SNAP benefits, some states chose to
maintain coverage for legal immigrants with state-funded programs (known as “fill-in” programs).
These states include California, Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Washington, and Wis-
consin. The eligibility rules for different immigrant groups on the state level have been consistent
throughout years, with little year to year change. Thus, the state fixed effect could capture the
2For example, single and two-parent families benefitted from all programs, while childless and nonemployed families
primarily benefitted from SNAP and UI increases and not the EITC. Families with at least one employed member
also benefitted from all three programs.
36
participation difference due to the state-level eligibility rule differences.
2.3 How SAVE Affects SNAP Participation
Following the literature, there are three types of classification errors in social welfare programs.
Type Ia errors (incomplete take up) occur if a program design results in some truly eligible individ-
uals not applying for benefits. Type Ib errors (rejection errors) occur if a program design results
in some truly eligible individuals applying for benefits and being rejected. Type II errors (award
errors) occur if a program design results in some truly ineligible individuals applying for benefits
and being accepted.
There are a number of ways that the SAVE program could affect SNAP participation. The par-
ticipation by immigrants has two components: the participation by qualified immigrants and the
participation by unqualified immigrants. First, rigorous immigrant status verification associated
with the SAVE adoption could reduce the fraudulent claims by discouraging unqualified immigrant
to apply for public benefits or rejecting applicants who are unqualified for public benefits. Without
the SAVE program, verifying immigrant status can be challenging. According to a report (Di-
nan, 2015), the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration claims that IRS agents have
insufficient expertise to properly assess the identity of illegal immigrants strictly from their for-
eign documents. Without specific training, government agencies will apply different standards to
determine what kinds of documents to accept. Some agencies only look to see that a foreign gov-
ernment stamped documents, while others probe further, looking for potential red flags. Adopting
the SAVE program standardizes the verification process and allows public benefit agency accurate
information to check immigrant status.
Second, the adoption of SAVE could add more complexity to the process of granting SNAP
benefits to applicants. The agency first submits an electronic query to USCIS using documents
provided by the applicant. In response, the system either provides the applicant’s immigration
status or asks the agency to take additional steps. If SAVE cannot immediately confirm immigration
status at this step, it will require further verification. In this case, the agency submits a form,
by mail, to a designated USCIS field office. In response, USCIS provides the agency with the
applicant’s immigration status “or the action to be taken” (in which case the process is complete),
but if status is not confirmed, options are provided to the agency on how to resolve the matter
(Center, 2011). As Kleven and Kopczuck (2011) argues, the associated complexity due to screening
for qualified applicants introduces transaction costs into the application process and may reduce
welfare participation. A number of empirical studies have shown that complexity and administrative
hassle reduce program enrollment (Currie and Grogger 2001, Bitler et al. 2003, and Aizer 2007).
Lastly, the implementation of the strict immigrant verification may signal a negative policy cli-
mate toward immigrants. Undocumented immigrants may be discouraged from applying for SNAP
for their US-born children due to the fear of deportation. Watson (2014) shows that heightened
enforcement reduces Medicaid participation among children of non-citizens.
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In summary, for childless immigrant adults, SAVE could both deter the fraudulent claims by
unqualified immigrants and decrease the participation by qualified immigrants. For the US-born
children who live with immigrant parents, there are possible confusions from both the benefit
granting agency and the immigrant parents on whether the immigrant status of parents needs to
be checked when they are applying on behalf of children.
2.4 Data and Summary Statistics
The analysis uses data from the March Annual Demographic Supplements to the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS) 2001-2014. The CPS asks whether each individual was covered by SNAP
in the previous calendar year. Therefore the study corresponds to 2000-2013 year participation.
I choose this period for the following considerations. The first treatment year is 2005 in Maine
and a majority of other states start around 2009. Some years prior to adopting the program are
needed in order to get a credible estimate on the pre-existing trends on SNAP participation. At the
same time, some research has documented the decline in the take-up of several safety net programs
of 3-4 percentage points following the 1996 welfare reform (Mazzolari, 2004). Therefore, starting
from four years after the 1996 welfare reform would better isolate the verification effects from 1996
welfare reform effects in welfare participation. At the same time, it also provides enough years to
estimate the pre-existing trends.
SNAP participation is measured at the household level. I therefore investigate both the household-
level participation rate in SNAP and the total number participating in the household. The primary
analysis focuses on two types of samples: adults living in households without children under age
18 (hereafter referred to as the childless adult sample) and US-born children living in households
with US-born children under age 18 (hereafter referred to as the US-born children sample). For
the adult sample, I study adults’ SNAP participation behavior. Since US-born children living with
immigrant parents are themselves eligible for SNAP, I focus on households without children to
isolate eligibility for immigrants from eligibility for their US-born children. For the US-born chil-
dren sample, I conduct a similar analysis on US-born children and investigate how the head of the
household’s immigrant status has differentially affected SNAP participation by US-born children.
To avoid the confounding factors that affect the poverty status of a state, which is a key factor in
determining a household’s eligibility for SNAP, I limit my sample to households with income below
the 200 percent poverty line.
A vector of controls includes individual-level control variables, household-level control variables
and state-level labor market conditions. Individual-level controls include a serial of the individual
(for the adult sample) and the household head (for the US-born children sample) characteristics:
age, sex, race, country of origin, education, employment status, whether she/he arrived in the
U.S. prior to 1982, and whether she/he resided in the U.S. for more than five years. For the US-
born children sample, I also include the children’s characteristics. Household-level control variables
include total family incomes and whether the household is under the poverty line. employment
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status, whether she/he arrived in the U.S. prior to 1982, and whether she/he resided in the U.S. for
more than five years. Individual characteristics account for the participation difference due to the
demographic composition difference. Previous research (Blank, 2001 and Fitzgerald, 1995) shows
that local labor market conditions are associated with longer welfare spells (AFDC). More relevant
to this study, Lofstrom and Bean (2002) find that local economic conditions are responsible for the
declines in immigrant welfare use following the passage of the PRWORA bill. Since the sample
time period overlaps with the Great Recession, the inclusion of labor market variables is key to
isolate the effect of the SAVE program on SNAP participation. I use state-level unemployment
rate, log of employment, and the employment-to-population ratio to control for local labor market
conditions.
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 present the summary statistics for the adult sample and the US-born
children sample separated by immigrant status and early states and late states. A few points are
worth highlighting. First, the states who adopted the SAVE system after 2004 have a smaller
fraction of immigrants in the total population since states who adopted the SAVE program late are
those who have received waivers from the SAVE program in earlier years. (The cost of using SAVE
would outweigh the savings because they had smaller immigrant population.) Most of the states
do not have as many immigrants as the states who adopted SAVE earlier. Therefore, the adoption
of SAVE is less prone to endogeneity issues. Second, there are a smaller fraction of Hispanics in the
total foreign-born population. Immigrants in treatment states appear to be slightly more educated.
Third, there is a higher SNAP participation in the states who adopted SAVE late. These patterns
suggest that it is important to control for potential differences across states, but also for pre-SAVE
differences in SNAP participation outcomes among foreign-borns and natives.
2.5 Identification Strategy and Estimation Results
2.5.1 Basic Difference-in-Difference Model
The identification strategy is to exploit state-time variation in adopting the SAVE program to
verify immigrant status for SNAP applicants. I compare the SNAP participation in states before
and after adopting the SAVE program by using states that have adopted the SAVE program prior
to 2004 as a control for secure change over time. To formalize the idea, I estimate the following
difference-in-difference model:
yist = β0 + β1SAV Est + αx
′
ist + ρyst + σs + γt + ist
The dependent variable yist is a participation outcome variable for individual i from state s in
year t. Participation outcomes include an indicator variable for household participation in SNAP
and the total number of participation in SNAP in the household. The main dependent variable
SAV E is an indicator variable. SAV Est = 1 if in the year t and all subsequent years, state s has
adopted the SAVE program for citizenship verification on SNAP applicants. SAV Est = 0 in all
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years prior to the SAVE adoption or if a state never adopted the SAVE program. σs indexes state
fixed effects. It controls for state-level time-invariant characteristics. For example, it effectively
absorbs state differences of generosity for immigrants’ access to SNAP that do no change over time.
γt indexes time fixed effects. This term captures the macroeconomic change and the eligibility rule
change for immigrants that is the same for all states. xist indexes individual level controls. yst is
state-level time-variant controls. It controls for state-wide labor market conditions and demographic
compositions, which should account for other factors that might be slowly changing at the state
level over time. Standard errors are clustered on states to account for common shocks.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present the difference-in-difference estimation for the childless adult sample
and the US-born children sample respectively. Overall, the results show a negative impact of SAVE
on SNAP participation, although most of the estimation results are not statistically significant.
2.5.2 Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference: Controlling for Differential
Trends
In order to interpret the OLS estimate of β1 as the effect of the SAVE program, one must assume
that without the program, the outcomes would have changed over time by the same amount in the
states that adopted the SAVE program later and for the other states (parallel trend assumption).
To address the concern of differential trends, I pool all immigrants and natives together and use the
US-born citizen group as a baseline group in the estimation. Specifically, I estimate the following
linear model:
yist = β0 + β1SAV Est · FBi + β2SAV Est + β3FBi + ρx′ist + σsFBi + γtFBi + σs + γt + ist
FBi is an indicator variable and FBi = 0 is the baseline group. For the adult sample, it
represents the US-born adults. For the US-born children sample, it represents the US-born children
from households headed by US-born citizens. FBi = 1 is the treatment group. For the childless
adult sample, it represents the foreign-born adults. For the US-born children sample, it represents
the US-born children living in the households headed by foreign-borns. Any effect of the state-wide
shocks (for example, the economics shocks or eligibility rule changes) that affect both US-born
citizens and foreign-borns should be fully accounted for in the estimate on the baseline group (β2).
β1 is the key variable of interest. It is the effect of the SAVE adoption on households headed by
foreign-born over and above the effect of SAVE on other children.
The full interaction between the basic difference-in-difference model and immigrant group ad-
dresses a few concerns. One concern is that the timing that most states start implementing the pro-
gram overlaps with the timing of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).3
3ARRA was an economic stimulus package enacted by the 111th United States Congress in February 2009 and
signed into law on February 17, 2009 by President Barack Obama. One of the objectives was to provide temporary
relief programs for those most impacted by the recession and invest in infrastructure, education, health, and renewable
energy. It provides $16.5 billion to increase SNAP benefits by 12 percent through fiscal 2011 and issue a one-time
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US-borns as a control group can account for the eligibility rule change that are common to both
US-borns and foreign-borns. A second concern is different immigrant groups may respond differ-
ently to labor market downturn in participating SNAP when I pool all natives and foreign-borns
together. A full interaction takes into account this differential response in SNAP participation
to labor market conditions. Finally, state-and-immigrant-group-specific effect further reduces the
potential bias from participation differences across states and immigrant groups. For example,
states with a longstanding history of immigrants may have more outreach efforts in enrolling im-
migrants into SNAP which would cause the participation difference between US-born citizens and
immigrants.
Table 2.7 presents the main results for the childless adult sample. Overall, SAVE has a small
and insignificant impact on SNAP participation for the adult sample. My preferred specification
(column 2) includes the individual-level control variables and state-level labor market and demo-
graphic control variables. After accounting for any demographic change and state labor market
condition change, the estimated effect for citizens is still small in magnitude and not statistically
significant. All the specifications consistently estimate a negative participation effect on foreign-
borns, although the effect is not statistically significant. Overall, before and after the adoption of
the SAVE program, relative to the US-born citizens, the foreign-born adults have seen an approx-
imately 2-3 percentage point drop in SNAP participation, but it is not statistically significant.
Panel A of Table 2.8 provides some suggestive evidence on the negative impact of SAVE on
SNAP participation in the household for the children sample. The estimated sign for the baseline
group (US-born children headed by US-born citizens) is positive across different specifications. The
positive sign could be due to the eligibility rule change or some other state-wide shock. The effect
for US-born children headed by foreign-borns are negative after accounting for the common shock.
My preferred specification (column 3) shows that relative to US-born children headed by citizens,
relative to US-born children headed by citizens, the US-born children headed by foreign-borns
have seen a roughly 5 percent point drop in SNAP participation, which is about 14% of the mean
participation rate for this group.
Panel B of Table 2.8 presents the analysis on log total participation for the children sample and
it shows negative impact consistent with panel A results. Since SNAP participation is not reported
on the individual level, the analysis on the household-level participation does not provide a full
picture of the participation effect following the SAVE adoption. I therefore conduct the analysis
on the total number of SNAP participation in a household. The outcome variable is measured as
the log value of total participation plus one. The reason for this transformation is to avoid the
selection bias due to non-participants. For example, if the SAVE program causes the immigrant
household that would have participated SNAP but with a lower total numbers to not participate in
SNAP, then it would appear that SNAP increases the total number of participation in a household.
Including the non-participants therefore avoids the participation selection bias. The sign on both
groups is consistent with the analysis on participation indicator variable (panel B). Before and after
bonus payment.
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the adoption of SAVE, the total number of SAVE participation in the households with foreign-born
heads decrease by around 8 percentage relative to the households with US-born household heads.
Compared to the mean total participation number in a household, this was a decrease of 10% total
participation per household.
2.5.3 Validity of the Identification Assumption
The key identifying assumption is that once I include individual- and state-level controls, the
timing of the SAVE adoption is not correlated with other factors that might have an effect on
participation outcomes. I perform a set of tests to show whether the SAVE adoption is associated
some key characteristics that would affect participation. The set of dependent variables include
employment status last year, education level, and whether the head has been in the US less than five
years. Panel A of Appendix Table B.3 presents a set of regressions for the adult sample. Panel B
presents the set of regressions for the children sample. All regressions do no include any covariates
other than state- and year-fixed effect. The employment status last year for the control groups in
both samples appear to be significantly estimated. This confirms the need for the difference-in-
difference-difference model. For the adult sample, after the SAVE adoption, states appear to have
more new immigrants in the non-citizen group. To the extent that most new immigrants in the
non-citizen category are not eligible for the SNAP benefit, I over-estimate the SAVE effect, if there
is any negative effect. My conclusion would still be robust. For the US-born children sample, I do
not observe a difference before and after the SAVE adoption using US-born children with US-born
with native heads as a control group.
2.5.4 Heterogeneous Impacts
Table 2.9 shows the heterogeneous impacts for the childless adult sample. Row 2 presents the
coefficients on SAVE dummy variable*indicators for whether an individual is an immigrant. Row
3 presents the coefficients on SAVE dummy variable*indicators for whether an individual is an
immigrant interacted with the characteristics listed in different columns. Overall, the signs of
the heterogeneous impacts are expected but not significantly estimated due to the small sample
size in the treatment group. High school educated, non-citizen foreign-born and individuals from
states with more undocumented immigrants all have a larger reduction in SNAP participation
following the SAVE adoption, although none of them are precisely estimated. The exception is
the first column: the impact on new arrival foreign-borns. This may be due to the fact that
newly arrived immigrants have very low participation in SNAP before the SAVE adoption in the
first place and the fact that there are more newly arrived immigrant after the SAVE adoption
(c.f., Appendix Table B.3). The results indicate no significant fraudulent claims by undocumented
immigrants. (Recall that non-citizen group is composed of roughly half legal immigrants and half
undocumented immigrants.) We can rule out larger than the 2.5% percent of fraudulent claims
prevented by SAVE.
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Panel A in Table 2.10 provides the analogous analysis on the US-born children sample. Although
most are estimated in the expected signs, none of them are significantly estimated. SAVE appears
to have statistically similar impact on children living in non-citizen foreign-born headed households
and naturalized-citizen foreign-born headed households.
Overall, I find a consistently estimated negative impact in different specifications on SNAP
participation by US-born children headed by non-citizens and naturalized citizens. This result
suggests a great confusion or error in applying the verification procedures.
2.6 Interpretations and Discussions
2.6.1 The Usage and Effectiveness of SAVE
The results suggest the reduction of SNAP participation among childless immigrant adults following
the adoption of SAVE is very limited: we can rule out larger than a decrease of 2.6% due to the SAVE
adoption. The decrease could be due to the decrease of fraud claims by unqualified immigrants
or the decrease of participation by qualified immigrants. Two possible reasons could explain the
limited decreased in SNAP participation by immigrant adults. The first reason is that SAVE may
not be effective in preventing frauds or the SAVE program was not strictly implemented. Ideally,
one would like to investigate the intensity of SAVE usage for SNAP. However, All public benefit
agency use SAVE for more than one program. Therefore, I focus on the state agency who use it only
for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 4 and SNAP. TANF is also a federally funded
program. Public benefit agency may use SAVE consistently for SNAP and TANF. Also, TANF
has very insignificant amount of participation compared to SNAP. Figure 2.3 indicates a positive
correlation between the total number of SNAP recipients and the SAVE requests for immigrant
status verification. This shows that at least the first stage is treated.
The second reason that SAVE does not prove to be effective in preventing frauds could be due
to the fact that frauds among unqualified immigrants due to their immigrant status are low in the
first place. To further investigate this hypothesis, I focus on an immigrant group who mostly are
not eligible: non-citizen immigrants who arrived in the US less than 5 years ago, who do not live
with any citizen or children in the household, and who do not live in one of those states with fill-in
programs for legal immigrants. The participation by this immigrant group is around 5%, compared
to the average of 15% for their national counterpart. Note that this is a slight overestimate of
fraud claims because the eligibility rules still make exceptions for some group, e.g. the disabled.
Generalized to the adult sample, this is a fiscal cost equal to $743,000 a year (average monthly
benefits per person ($133.07) × 12 months × total number of non-citizen adult population in 2013
(9318) × percentage of fraud (5%)) . The fraud by the immigrant adults who do not have children
under age 18 would at most cause the federal dollars at $743,000 a year, compared to the total
SNAP cost of $79,929.78 millions a year.
4The TANF program provides cash assistance to children and their caregivers, mostly to those with only one
biological parent present, mostly single mothers. Eligibility requires low income and assets.
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2.6.2 The Unintended Impact on US-born Children
The analysis on the US-born children sample suggests modest impacts of SAVE on SNAP partici-
pation by US-born children living with immigrant household heads. The participation rate in the
household level decreases by 12% and the total number of participation in the household decreases
by 8% following the adoption of SAVE. According to 2013 American Community Survey, 40% of
immigrant headed households have at least one US-born children under 18 living in the household,
and they make up about 20% of the total US-born children. My analysis suggests that policy
that aim at limiting the access of public benefits for immigrants also induce unintended impact on
US-born children, especially those who live with immigrant parents.
2.7 Conclusions
My results suggest a need to oversee programs that aim at immigrants in order to minimize the
negative spillover in their US-born children. The verification process should be implemented pre-
cisely to avoid confusion in already complicated welfare program eligibility. It is also important to
note that the fraud I focus on in this paper is only the type of fraud due to unqualified immigrant
status. According to GAO (1997), a few California counties’ studies of AFDC households indicate
that the rates and types of fraud are similar both for households headed by illegal immigrants
and for the general welfare population. In these studies, one of the most commonly cited types of
misrepresentation or fraud was the underreporting of income. The states visited by GAO had pro-
cedures in place to verify income, but officials said that verifying individuals’ income from earnings
obtained through the underground economy was very difficult, in part because these earnings are
not documented or reported to state or federal databases used to verify employment or earnings.
Improving income verification would therefore be more effective for reducing fraudulent claims.
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Figure 2.1: Participation Rate of SNAP
Figure 2.2: Participation Rate of SNAP and Medicaid by Children
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Figure 2.3: Total Number of SNAP Recipients and SAVE Requests for SNAP and TANF
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Table 2.1: States that Adopted SAVE after 2004 and their
Immigrant Status Composition
State Year of Adoption
Estimated Number of
Undocumented Immigrants
Maine 2005 less than 10,000
Hawaii 2009 40,000
Mississippi 2009 45,000
Montana 2009 less than 10,000
Louisiana 2010 65,000
Michigan 2011 150,000
Data Sources: year of adoption on the SAVE program data is
accessed through a FOIA request. Undocumented immigrants
estimates are measured in 2010 and come from Passel and Cohn
(2010). When the total number of undocumented immigrants is
less than 10,000, an accurate number is not provided.
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Table 2.5: Difference-in-Difference Estimation of SNAP Participation: The Childless
Adult Sample Under the 200% Poverty Line
Dependent Variable: Participation (Linear Probability Estimation)
Immigrants Natives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SAVE 0.007 -0.014 -0.012 -0.002 0.001 -0.016
(0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Observations 44,563 44,563 44,563 231,618 231,618 231,618
R-squared 0.146 0.146 0.148 0.104 0.104 0.105
State and Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
State * Post 2009 X X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X X
State Labor Market Conditions X X X X
State-Specific Trends X X
NOTE: All regressions are linear probability regressions. Standard deviation is reported in
parentheses. The outcome variable is measured at the household level. The regressions are
clustered at the state level. All regressions include state fixed effects, time fixed effects and
the interaction term state*an indicator whether the year is after 2009. Demographic controls
include age, sex, race, education, country of origin, employment status, total family income,
poverty status, an indicator for whether the individual resided in the U.S. more than five years,
and an indicator for whether the individual arrived the U.S. prior to 1982. State-level labor
market conditions include state unemployment rate, log of total employment, the employment-
to-population ratio, the fraction of immigrants who live in the U.S. less than five years, and
the fraction of foreign-born in the total population.
* significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.6: Difference-in-Difference Estimation of SNAP Participation: The US-born
Children Sample Under the 200% Poverty Line
Immigrant Household Head Native Household Head
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Participation
SAVE -0.052 -0.041 -0.025 0.013 0.026** 0.000
(0.039) (0.040) (0.044) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Observations 69,490 69,490 69,490 255,638 255,638 255,638
R-squared 0.192 0.192 0.194 0.222 0.222 0.223
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Log(Total Number of Participation)
SAVE -0.101* -0.083 -0.022 0.018 0.033* -0.003
(0.058) (0.060) (0.066) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021)
Observations 69,490 69,490 69,490 255,638 255,638 255,638
R-squared 0.213 0.213 0.214 0.240 0.240 0.241
State and Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
State * Post 2009 X X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X X
State Labor Market Conditions X X X X
State-Specific Trends X X
NOTE: Standard deviation is reported in parentheses. The outcome variable is measured at
the household level. The regressions are clustered at the state level. All regressions include
state fixed effects, time fixed effects and the interaction term state*an indicator whether the
year is after 2009. Demographic controls include age, sex, race, country of origin, household
head’s education, household head’s employment status, total family income, poverty status,
an indicator for whether the household head resided in the U.S. more than five years, and
an indicator for whether the household head arrived the U.S. prior to 1982. State-level labor
market conditions include state unemployment rate, log of total employment, the employment-
to-population ratio, the fraction of immigrants who live in the U.S. less than five years, and the
fraction of foreign-born in the total population.
* significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.7: Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Estimation of
SNAP Participation: The Childless Adult Sample Under the
200% Poverty Line
Dependent Variable: Participation (Linear Probability Estimation)
(1) (2) (3) )
Foreign-Born* SAVE -0.024 -0.023 -0.002
(0.021) (0.022) (0.035)
Observations 276,181 276,181 276,181
R-squared 0.105 0.105 0.106
State and Year Fixed Effects X X X
State * Post 2009 X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
State Labor Market Conditions X X
State-Specific Trends X
NOTE: All regressions are linear probability regressions. Standard de-
viation is reported in parentheses. The outcome variable is measured
at the household level. The regressions are clustered at the state level.
All regressions include state fixed effects, time fixed effects and the
interaction term state*an indicator whether the year is after 2009. De-
mographic controls include age, sex, race, education, country of origin,
employment status, total family income, poverty status, an indicator
for whether the individual resided in the U.S. more than five years,
and an indicator for whether the individual arrived the U.S. prior to
1982. State-level labor market conditions include state unemployment
rate, log of total employment, the employment-to-population ratio, the
fraction of immigrants who live in the U.S. less than five years, and
the fraction of foreign-born in the total population.
* significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***signifi-
cant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.8: Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Estimation of SNAP Participation: The US-born
Children Sample Under the 200% Poverty Line
Participation log(Total # of Participation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign-Born Household Head*SAVE -0.056** -0.057** -0.027 -0.107*** -0.112*** -0.032
(0.025) (0.025) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.060)
Observations 325,128 325,128 325,128 325,128 325,128 325,128
R-squared 0.217 0.217 0.219 0.236 0.236 0.237
State and Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
State * Post 2009 X X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X X
State Labor Market Conditions X X X X
State-Specific Trends X X
NOTE: Standard deviation is reported in parentheses. The outcome variable is measured at the household
level. The regressions are clustered at the state level. All regressions include state fixed effects, time fixed
effects and the interaction term state*an indicator whether the year is after 2009. Demographic controls
include age, sex, race, country of origin, household head’s education, household head’s employment status,
total family income, poverty status, an indicator for whether the household head resided in the U.S. more
than five years, and an indicator for whether the household head arrived the U.S. prior to 1982. State-level
labor market conditions include state unemployment rate, log of total employment, the employment-to-
population ratio, the fraction of immigrants who live in the U.S. less than five years, and the fraction of
foreign-born in the total population.
* significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.9: Linear Probability Estimation of SNAP Participation: The Childless Adult Sam-
ple Under the 200% Poverty Line
New Arrivals High-School
Non-citizen
Foriegn-Born
Big
States
Panel A: The Childless Adult Sample
-0.020 -0.041∗ -0.039 -0.069
SAVE × Foreign-Born
(0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.045)
0.018 -0.016 -0.009 -0.042
SAVE × Foreign-Born × characteristics
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.049)
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Observations 276181 276181 276181 276181
NOTE: Standard deviation is reported in parentheses. The outcome variable is measured at the
household level. The regressions are clustered by the state level. All regressions include state fixed
effect and time fixed effect. Individual Controls include age, sex, race, education, employment status,
total family incomes, poverty status, an indicator for whether the head resided in the U.S. more than
five years, and an indicator for whether the head arrived the U.S. prior to 1982. State-level controls
include state unemployment rate, log of total employment, the employment-to-population ratio, the
fraction of immigrants who live in the U.S. less than five years, and the fraction of foreign-born in
the total population.
* significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.10: Linear Probability Estimation of SNAP Participation: The US-born Children
Sample Under the 200% Poverty Line
New Arrivals High-School
Non-Citizen
Foriegn-Born
Big
States
Dependent Variable: Participation (Linear Probability Estimation)
-0.054 -0.042 -0.046∗ -0.069
SAVE × Foreign-Born
(0.037) (0.026) (0.027) (0.049)
-0.011 0.009 0.002 -0.032
SAVE × Foreign-Born × characteristics
(0.030) (0.020) (0.018) (0.055)
R2 0.2 0.22 0.22 0.22
Dependent Variable: log(Total Number of Participation) (OLS)
-0.124∗∗ -0.086∗ -0.082∗ -0.134∗
SAVE × Foreign-Born
(0.057) (0.039) (0.041) (0.075)
-0.055 0.038 -0.011 -0.078
SAVE × Foreign-Born × characteristics
(0.046) (0.030) (0.028) (0.084)
R2 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
NOTE: Standard deviation is reported in parentheses. The outcome variable is measured at the
household level. The regressions are clustered by the state level. The total observation numbers are
325128. All regressions include state fixed effect and time fixed effect. Individual controls include
age, sex, race, education, employment status, total family incomes, poverty status, an indicator for
whether the head resided in the U.S. more than five years, and an indicator for whether the head
arrived the U.S. prior to 1982. State-level controls include state unemployment rate, log of total
employment, the employment-to-population ratio, the fraction of immigrants who live in the U.S.
less than five years, and the fraction of foreign-born in the total population. Anti-Immigrant states
are the states who have passed comprehensive anti-immigrant legislation since 2000.
* significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.
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Chapter 3
Demographic Structure and the
Political Economy of State-Level
Anti-Illegal Immigration Legislation
3.1 Introduction
In the U.S., authority to regulate immigration is vested with the federal government. At the same
time, the local and state government bear the great share of the fiscal cost associated with im-
migrants. In response to the federal government’s failure to enact meaningful reform in the past
decade and concerned with the rising fiscal cost associated with immigrants, there has been a
considerable increase in state-level legislation that aims to indirectly reduce the inflows of undoc-
umented immigrants. In 2013, 184 bills were passed in 45 states, a five-fold increase over the 37
bills passed in 2005. Yet, because states’ effort to limit undocumented immigrants is a relatively
new phenomenon, the political process and motivations behind this anti-immigration legislation is
not well understood.
In this paper, I study the driving forces of state-level anti-immigrant legislation since 2005. In
particular, I focus on how demographic structure affects a legislative district representative’s voting
decision on the anti-immigrant bills, especially bills related to immigrants’ access to public service.
I demonstrate that districts with a more established immigrant population and a higher fraction of
non-Hispanic black population tend to vote against anti-immigrant legislation, while districts with
a large fraction of Hispanic population tend to vote for anti-immigrant legislation.
While the congressional politics of immigration policy has been widely studied in the literature
(Goldin, 1993; Gimpel and Edwards Jr, 1998), few studies have investigated state-level immigration
legislation. Previous works at the state level (for instance, Boushey and Luedtke, 2011) commonly
rely on the number of bills enacted to gauge the anti-immigrant activities. However, different bills
with different emphasis would likely have different political motivation behind them. Therefore,
my study only focuses on one type of bills: bills related to immigrants’ access to public benefits.
Furthermore, several papers that study the state-level legislation focus on state-level variation in
determining the drivers of immigrant legislation (Boushey and Luedtke, 2011 and Rivera, 2014). In
contrast, I compile a novel dataset with a wealth of legislative-district-level characteristics. Then,
I match it with votes in individual bills from the state House of Representatives and Senate. By
investigating the district-level characteristics, I establish a relationship between a representative’s
home district characteristics and his/her voting behavior in each individual bill. Kanazawa (2005)
employs a similar approach to study anti-Chinese immigration legislation in California in the 1850s.
57
However, this paper focuses on the bills within a much different time frame when the anti-immigrant
sentiment has shifted to mostly Hispanic immigrants. Overall, I find that the politics of immigration
policy in the state legislative level is largely consistent with the congressional district level. The
results are also consistent with Goldin (1993), which focuses on early anti-immigrant sentiment
towards European immigrants and Asian immigrants.
The structure of the paper is as follows: I begin with an introduction of state-level public service
related immigration legislation. Next, I discuss the data and how I compile the state legislative-
district level data. Then, the paper presents the econometric specification that provides the basis for
this study and several specifications are explored. Finally, I conclude and discuss a few limitations
of the current analysis.
3.2 An Overview of State Immigration Legislation on Immigrant
Public Service Access, 2005-2011
In this section, I provide a brief chronology of state-level immigration legislation and an overview
of their most common provisions. In this paper, I focus on public benefit related immigration
legislation.
Although with limited jurisdiction over immigration-related issues, states have long been active
in immigration enforcement by passing state bills not only in the area of law enforcement but in
public benefits, employment, driver’s licenses and so forth. In 2013, 184 bills were passed in 45
states, a five times increase compared to the 37 bills passed in 2005. Table 3.1 lists the state-level
public service related immigration legislation passed since 2005. The public service related immigra-
tion legislation typically includes the following provisions: limiting the undocumented immigrants’
access to only federally required public benefits, providing strict and explicit requirements to ensure
the limited access to public benefits for immigrants, and requiring the reports of fraudulent welfare
claims from immigrants.
A few points are wroth highlighting. First, states that passed anti-immigrant bills are ones
that have recently seen large inflows of undocumented immigrants. Unlike states like California or
Texas with established immigrant population, the political power of immigrants in these states are
very limited. Second, many bills are lopsided roll calls. I define “lopsided” roll calls as those where
more than 65 percent or fewer than 35 percent of representatives vote “yay”. Lastly, most of these
roll calls overlaps with the period of the Great Recession.
The preferences of native individuals residing in the legislative district are represented by the
local legislator. In choosing whether to support an immigration policy, the representative maximizes
the probability of being reelected.
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3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Empirical Framework
To estimate the link between a district representative’s vote with her/his home district’s demo-
graphic structure, I estimate the following linear probability model:
V oteist = α+ βDemographicsist + σs + γt + it
Where the dependent variable, V oteist is a dichotomous variable. V oteist = 1 if a representative
of legislative district i from state s votes “Yes” on an anti-immigrant bill in year t, and V oteist = 0
if the representative votes “No”. In all cases, therefore, a “Yes” vote is interpreted as a vote in
favor of a bill restricting immigrants’ access to public benefit at year t.
I pool data from all states and districts together to conserve degrees of freedom for a total of
1993 observations. I include state fixed effect σs to account for any differences across states that
do not change over time. For example, the differences in political institutions, ideology, and the
degree of party competition across state legislatures would be absorbed in the state fixed effect.
Therefore, I exploit the variation across legislative districts within states. I use year fixed effect γt
to account for the differences between bills passed in different years.
3.3.2 State Legislative District-Level Data and Summary Statistics
The unit of analysis is the legislative district. A state legislature in the United States is the
legislative body of one of the 50 U.S. states. Every state except Nebraska has a bicameral legislature,
meaning that the legislature consists of two separate legislative chambers or houses, usually called
a House and Senate.
The outcome variable of interest is legislative votes on anti-immigration bills by state House of
Representatives and Senate. I use the data from Project Vote Smart (PVS).1 The data includes
the representative’s name, party affiliation, and his/her legislative district and vote on each single
bill. I supplement these data with recorded votes from state legislature websites when the voting
information is not available in PVS.
The key demographic variables of interest are the fraction of non-Hispanic black, Hispanic,
foreign-born, and elder population in total population. Since the time period I focus on spans 2005
to 2010, I use demographic information for 2006-2010 from the 5-year American Community Survey
for two reasons. First, unlike other single-year or 3-year ACS data which only have selective counties
(usually counties with large population) identified, 5-year ACS data identify all counties. Second,
it also provides a large enough sample size. The variables will be less prone to measurement errors.
Other demographic characteristics data include percent of population with at least college degree
1Project Vote Smart is a non-profit, non-partisan research organization that collects and distributes information
on candidates for public office in the United States. It covers candidates and elected officials in six basic areas:
background information, issue positions (via the Political Courage Test), voting records, campaign finances, interest
group ratings, and speeches and public statements.
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and percent of population living in urban areas. Percent of population with at least college degree
measures the percentage of the population over 25 with at least a college degree. I also include the
party affiliation of the legislator. Party is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the representative of the
district belongs to the Democratic Party.
The economics characteristics data include median household income level, poverty rate, un-
employment rate, and inequality. These variables also come from 2006-2010 5-year ACS. The
inequality is measured as the ratio of mean to median household income. Median family income
and inequality, are two main variables that affect the demand for redistribution. Legislators from
wealthier districts (higher median household income) are expected to exhibit less favorable atti-
tudes towards immigrants’ public service access. Meltzer and Richard (1981) shows that increase
in inequality (the gap between the mean and median household income), leads to stronger support
for redistribution. However, a priori, it is not clear how it affects the preference for redistribution
for immigrants.
I convert the county-level characteristics to the district-level characteristics by 2010 population
weight from MABLE/Geocorr12: Geographic Correspondence Engine.
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for the variables described above. A few points are worth
highlighting. First, 34% of the representatives voted against the bill. To the extent that multiple
bills are lopsided votes, the party plays a less important role in affecting the voting decision. Second,
about 65% of the legislators are Republicans, implying that the states that passed the bills are more
conservative states. Third, these states have a large share of population that is non-Hispanic black
population.
The main goal of the paper is to investigate whether a systematic relationship exists between
a representative’s voting behavior on immigration bills and the demographic structure of his/her
home district.
3.3.3 Results
The main results in Table 3.3 demonstrate that districts with established immigrant population
and a large fraction of non-Hispanic black population tend to vote against anti-immigrant bills.
In contrast to the previous findings by (Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011), however, districts with a
higher fraction of Hispanic population tend to vote for the anti-immigrant bills. The first three
columns present the estimate without including the representative’s party affiliation. I first estimate
the model without additional covariates (column 1). The pro-immigrant attitude from districts
with more established immigrant population is consistent with the finding in the literature: for
example, Goldin (1993) finds that longstanding contact with immigrants will reduce the pressures
to pass anti-immigrant legislation. The negative sign for fraction of non-Hispanic black population
is consistent with findings by Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) and Gonzalez (2000). It suggests
non-Hispanic blacks tend to view immigrant issues in the minority right framework. In contrast,
districts with a large fraction of Hispanic population are estimated to vote for anti-immigrant
legislation. Districts with higher percentage of old population are estimated to be against the
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generosity towards immigrant welfare state. This is likely due to the fear of threat from immigrants
for competing limited government resources. The sign on median household income is consistent
with the findings in the literature, although not significant (Meltzer and Richard, 1981 and Facchini
and Mayda, 2009): wealthier area are less supportive of immigrants’ welfare access. The effect of
unemployment rate does not reveal a clear pattern across specifications.
The inclusion of a representative’s party affiliation (the last three columns) attenuates the
effect of the percentage of foreign-born and the percentage of non-Hispanic black population. This
suggests districts with higher percentage of foreign-born and non-Hispanic black population tend to
elect a Democratic representative. Adding the party variable also attenuates the effect of Hispanic
population. However, this suggests the opposite: Republican representatives are more likely to be
elected in districts with a higher proportion of Hispanic population. This is consistent with Baerg
et al. (2014), who finds a negative relationship between the share of the county’s workforce that is
unauthorized or that is Hispanic and the share of votes going to Democrats in elections. Note that
party of a legislator is very endogenous variable. To the extent that most of the roll calls are lopsided
votes, party variable is not necessarily an omitted variable to add in the specification. The signs
of these three key demographic variables are consistently estimated across different specifications,
although the effect of foreign-born population and Hispanic population become insignificant when
the share of college graduate is added, possibly due to multicollinearity.
The estimate on party shows that Republicans are significantly more likely to vote in favor of
strict immigration bills. This result is in line with earlier findings by Facchini and Steinhardt (2011)
and Gimpel and Edwards Jr (1998). Gimpel and Edwards Jr (1998) concludes that “recorded votes
on immigration policy have become more partisan over time, even after controlling for alternative
influences on congressional decision making such as region and constituency characteristics.”
3.3.4 Heterogeneous Analysis on Hispanic Effects
Table 3.4 presents the heterogeneous analysis to show where the Hispanic effect stems from. Three
possible mechanisms may explain why districts with higher fraction of Hispanic show more anti-
immigrant sentiment. First, Hispanic communities may not have enough political power due to their
lower voter turnout or higher percentage of undocumented immigrants who are not eligible to vote.
Second, it might also suggest Hispanic communities have more displacement threat from incoming
immigrants for competing scarce public benefit. Lastly, it may simply due to the perception that
Hispanics tend to be undocumented immigrants and take up public benefits when a community
has a larger contact with Hispanic population. Columns 1 and 2 show the analysis replacing the
percentage of Hispanic population as the percentage of US-born Hispanic and foreign-born Hispanic
in separate estimation. Since the correlation between the shares of US-born Hispanic and foreign-
born Hispanic is 0.75, I estimate the Hispanic effect by nativity separately. The effect of foreign-born
Hispanic is not significant. In contrast, the effect of US-born Hispanic is marginally significant.
This is likely due to the small sample size of Hispanic foreign-borns: in the estimated sample, 60%
of the Hispanic population are Hispanic citizens. Column 3 to Column 5 show the analysis by
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household income quantile. The low income areas tend to be in favor of strict immigrant legislation
for immigrants’ public service access. This suggests the anti-immigrant legislation is more driven
by the fear of displacement from low-income districts. This is consistent with findings by Hanson
et al. (2007) and Facchini and Mayda (2009), which suggest that the welfare state affects individual
attitudes toward immigrants.
3.4 Conclusion
To conclude, I show that districts with more established immigrant population and higher fraction
of African Americans tend to vote against anti-immigrant legislation. In contrast to the previ-
ous findings by Facchini and Steinhardt (2011), however, districts with large fraction of Hispanic
population tend to vote for anti-immigrant legislation. Heterogeneous analysis suggests the anti-
immigrant legislation is more driven by the fear of displacement or the perception about Hispanics.
Further analysis also suggests a non-linearity between foreign-born population and attitudes toward
immigrants.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Legislative-Level Measures
VARIABLES N Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Vote 1,993 0.744 0.437 0 1
Party 1,993 0.357 0.479 0 1
% Foreign-Born 2006-2010 1,993 0.0740 0.0542 0.00331 0.255
% Hispanic 2006-2010 1,993 0.0926 0.0829 0.00453 0.562
% African-American 2006-2010 1,993 0.184 0.175 0.000305 0.687
% College 2006-2010 1,993 0.257 0.0959 0.0811 0.570
% Old 2006-2010 1,993 0.118 0.0291 0.0594 0.233
Median Household Income 2006-2010 1,993 48,541 9,650 24,191 99,198
Unemployment Rate 2006-2010 1,993 0.0654 0.0162 0.0255 0.138
Inequality 2006-2010 1,993 1.311 0.0864 1.085 1.590
NOTE: Vote and party affiliation of the representatives are in the legislative district level.
Party is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the representative of the district belongs to the
Democratic Party. All other variables are weighted to legislative-level. Percent of population
with at least college degree measures the percentage of the population over 25 with at least
a college degree. The unemployment rate as the ratio of the number of people unemployed
over the total number of people for 16 years and over in the labor force. Median household
income measures the median household income within a district. Inequality measures the
ratio between mean and median household income within a district. All monetary values
are measured in 2010 dollars.
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Table 3.3: Linear Probability Estimates of Representatives’ Votes on Anti-Immigrant
Bills
Dependent Variable: Vote on Public Service Only Bills
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% Foreign-Born -1.389*** -1.397*** -1.356** -1.089*** -0.709 -0.654
(0.369) (0.422) (0.526) (0.306) (0.435) (0.471)
% Hispanic 0.690** 0.692** 0.766** 0.732*** 0.592* 0.550
(0.342) (0.346) (0.388) (0.283) (0.321) (0.349)
% African-American -1.266*** -1.267*** -1.044*** -0.506*** -0.412*** -0.411***
(0.0958) (0.0967) (0.129) (0.0860) (0.110) (0.110)
% Elderly -0.0231 0.876 0.997* 0.945*
(0.550) (0.631) (0.521) (0.549)
ln(Median Income) 0.119 0.0542 0.0782
(0.0943) (0.0780) (0.111)
Unemployment Rate -0.140 1.354 1.298
(1.080) (0.895) (0.914)
% College -0.0856
(0.280)
Party -0.479*** -0.481*** -0.480***
(0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0210)
Observations 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156
R-squared 0.196 0.196 0.205 0.449 0.458 0.458
NOTE: Dependent variable Vote=1 if the legislator vote yes on an anti-immigrant bill. Party is
a dummy variable coded as 1 if the representative of the district belongs to the Democratic Party.
Inequality describes the ratio between mean and median family income within a district. State
fixed effect and year fixed effect are included in all specifications. The last column is clustered
at the state level. The control variables include the percentage of the population over 25 with at
least a bachelor degree, log of median household income, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and
percentage of population living in urban areas.
Standard deviation is reported in parentheses.
* significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level;***significant at the 1% level.
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Appendix A
Data
A.1 School District Finance Data
A.1.1 Independent School District
The school-district finance data come from the Historical Database on Individual Government
Finances (INDFIN)1 and Common Core of Data (CCD) School District Finance Survey (F-33).
The INDFIN contains school district finance data annually for independent school districts from
1967 to 1991. It comprises over 1.4 million individual local government records, including counties,
cities, townships, special districts, and independent school districts. Beginning with the fiscal
year 1989, detailed fiscal data on all public revenues and expenditures within states for regular
pre-kindergarten to grade 12 education has been collected in National Public Education Financial
Survey Data, Common Core of Data (CCD) School District Finance Survey (F-33).
There are some slight differences in revenue definition across these two data sources. First,
state spending on behalf of school districts’ employee benefits (C38) and state spending on behalf
of school districts’ other than employee benefits (C39) are included in the state spending subtotal
TSTREV and total revenue TOTALREV in NCES data, but not in the census of government data.
NCES Local, Census State Revenue. The C24 category is reserved for any tax item classified as
state by the U.S. Census Bureau and as local by the NCES. The F-33 file contains several items
involving the transfer of funds among school districts. Local Revenue From Other School Systems
(D11) consists of payments received from other school districts for providing services. Payments to
Other School Systems (Q11) are expenditures made to other school districts for providing services.
These items are included in the summary revenue (TLOCREV and TOTALREV) and expenditure
(TOTALEXP) items for each district. For certain years, local spending or total revenue from the
census exclude the D11 transfer items. To maintain the consistency over years, I choose the NCES
data over Census of Government for school district analysis. For state level analysis, I aggregate
the school district level data from Census of Government due to its long time span. INDFIN does
not have finance information prior to 1996.
I drop special school districts that are not based on geography but instead serve population
with special needs. Such special districts are not regulated by the states’ normal school finance
laws.
1Special thanks go to Stephen Wheeler for answering my questions about details of this data.
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Prior to the year of 1972, only selected samples of school districts have fiscal information. I
therefore use 1972 (the census year) to replace the year 1970.
A.1.2 Dependent School District
School district finance data is missing for dependent school districts in Census of Government
INDFIN data.2 This includes all school districts in states of Maryland, Virginia, and North
Carolina, and part of school districts in some states (Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, and
Tennessee). I obtain the spending data from their parent government finance data, usually city
government, county government or municipal government.
A.2 School District Demographic Data
I use the relevant children as defined in school district tabulation data. The 2000 School District
Tabulation defines a child as a person age 0 to 17 (as of April 1, 2000) or a person age 18 or 19
who is not a high school graduate (based on the educational attainment response from the Census
2000 questionnaire). This definition slightly differs from the child definition used in the 1990 school
district tabulation in two ways. First, the 1990 definition of children did not include people ages 0
to 2. Second, the 1990 tabulation did not include high school graduates under age 18 as children.
There would be some slight over count in 2000 data. To the extent that we are calculating the
percentage, this discrepancy in definition should be absorbed in the percentage and year effect.
There are about 810 school districts missing student characteristics. These are all small school
districts, with an average enrollment size of 36 students. Some of these school districts do not have
school finance information either.
A.3 School District Boundary Changes
To construct consistently defined school districts over time, I use the School District Geographic
Reference File, 1969-1979 to determine the fraction of each tract’s total population inside the
borders of each school district in 1970. I then assign these tracts to the school districts from other
years by this population weight.
2Spending information on dependent school districts are often left out in the school finance literature.
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Table B.3: Validity Test
Dependent Variable
Employment Status
Last Year Education
Head Arrived
Less than 5 Years
Panel A: The Childless Adult Sample Under the 200% Poverty Line
0.019∗∗ 0.010 N.A.
SAVE
(0.009) (0.021) N.A.
-0.017 0.065 -0.024∗∗
SAVE*Naturalized Citizens
(0.049) (0.116) (0.012)
0.089 0.142 0.103∗∗∗
SAVE*Non-Cizitens
(0.056) (0.130) (0.014)
R2 0.03 0.04 0.28
Observations 17707 17707 177077
Panel B: The US-born Children Sample Under the 200% Poverty Line
-0.015∗∗ -0.001 N.A.
SAVE
(0.007) (0.001) N.A.
0.019 -0.003 -0.005
SAVE*Naturalized Citizen Head
(0.041) (0.007) (0.010)
-0.013 0.000 0.010
SAVE*Non-Citizen Head
(0.036) (0.006) (0.008)
R2 0.01 0.00 0.08
Observations 325128 325128 325128
State and Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes
NOTE: All regressions are linear probability regressions. Standard deviation is reported in
parentheses. The unit of analysis is household-level. The regressions are clustered by the
state level. All regressions include state fixed effect and time fixed effect.
* significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.
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